Tag Archives: defences

Victim Fine Surcharges ruled to be Unconstitutional and contrary to Section 12 of the Charter (Cruel and Unusual Punishment) – Regina v. Boudreault, 2018 SCC 58 (CanLII)

Supreme Court of Canada strikes down Victim Fine Surcharges.
Supreme Court of Canada strikes down Victim Fine Surcharges.
 
Upon the imposition of penalty, the Criminal Code of Canada (R.S.C.., 1985, c. C-46)once imposed a victim find surcharges upon the entry of a conviction and/or penalty pursuant to section s. 737.   The amount is set by law and is owed for each and every summary conviction or indictable offence. The surcharge is intended to fund government programs designed to assist victims of crime. The surcharge applies regardless of the severity of the crime, the characteristics of the offender, or the effects of the crime on the victim.  That section said:
737 (1) An offender who is convicted, or discharged under section 730, of an offence under this Act, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act or the Cannabis Act shall pay a victim surcharge, in addition to any other punishment imposed on the offender. Amount of surcharge (2) Subject to subsection (3), the amount of the victim surcharge in respect of an offence is (a) 30 per cent of any fine that is imposed on the offender for the offence; or (b) if no fine is imposed on the offender for the offence, (i) $100 in the case of an offence punishable by summary conviction, and (ii) $200 in the case of an offence punishable by indictment.
That section was struck down by the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v. Boudreault, 2018 SCC 58 (CanLII), wherein the majority of that Court struck down the mandatory victim surcharge. A Supreme Court hard a number of appeals together considering the same issue.  The section is now of no force or effect.  The majority held the victim surcharge was a form of “punishment,” and therefore subject to the Charter right against cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to Section 12 of the Charter.  Some of the offenders before the Court lived in dire straights (i.e. serious poverty, deliberating addiction issues, deplorable housing, and physical issues).  Some of these offenders were recidivists, who regularly appeared before the courts, and got fined.   What is more, the consequences of failing to pay to fee could (but not necessarily) result in being taken into custody (at her Majesty’s Institutions), among other things (i.e. collection agency actions).  A fit sentence for the appellants would not include such a fine, and the overall operation and effects of the mandatory fine were grossly disproportionate.
The court continued by positing that the ongoing enforcement of victim surcharges that were imposed before the date of its judgment would violate s.12 of the Charter at each step. This could arise, where the offender is arrested or brought to court for a financial update.  The Court stated:
The surcharge constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and therefore violates s. 12 of the Charter, because its impact and effects create circumstances that are grossly disproportionate to what would otherwise be a fit sentence, outrage the standards of decency, and are both abhorrent and intolerable. In the circumstances of this case, the fit sentence for the offenders would not have included the surcharge, as it would have caused undue hardship given their impecuniosity. Sentencing is first and foremost an individualized exercise which balances various goals, while taking into account the particular circumstances of the offender as well as the nature and number of his or her crimes. The crucial issue is whether the offenders are able to pay, and in this case, they are not.
However, the court left open the issue of remedy for persons in this situation, but suggested that remedies are available under s.24(1) of the Charter, and that Parliament could act administratively to create a remedy.
There were two (2) dissenting Justice.  Justice Côté, writing in dissent for herself, and Justice Rowe,would have held that:
[114] I respectfully disagree.  While I accept that the mandatory imposition of the victim surcharge may have a particularly negative impact on impecunious offenders, I cannot accept that it amounts to treatment or punishment that is truly “cruel and unusual”, as that phrase has been interpreted in this Court’s jurisprudence.  Moreover, I am of the view that the impugned provision does not deprive impecunious offenders of their security of the person, and that any deprivation of liberty that may result from the application of s. 737 of the Criminal Code accords with the principles of fundamental justice.  For these reasons, I discern no violation of either ss. 12 or 7 of the Charter, and I would dismiss the appeals accordingly.
If you have been charged with a criminal offence, contact Mr. J.S. Patel, Criminal Lawyer in Toronto and Calgary at 403-585-1960.

Striking or Vacating a guilty plea in Criminal Courts in Canada. Legal Requirements from the Supreme Court of Canada.

Removal of a guilty plea
Guilty pleas, striking or vacating a guilty plea in Canada.

“Simply put, pleading guilty is the decision of the accused, not a reasonable accused, or someone like the accused.”


In Regina v. Wong, 2018 SCC 25, a 4:3 majority of the Supreme Court of Canadaheld that when an accused person seeks to withdraw a guilty plea on the basis that he or she did not appreciate the consequences of that plea, he or she must establish subjective prejudice.


The Supreme Court said that an Accused person who seeks to withdraw their guilty plea on the basis that they were unaware of legally relevant consequences at the time of the plea should be required to establish subjective prejudice. To that end, the accused must file an affidavit establishing a reasonable possibility that he or she would have either (1) opted for a trial and pleaded not guilty; or (2) pleaded guilty, but with different conditions.


Because the original guilty plea is an exercise of the accused’s own subjective judgment, it logically follows that the test for withdrawing that plea should also be directed to the accused’s subjective judgment. The inquiry is subjective to the accused, but allows for an objective assessment of the credibility of the accused’s subjective claim. Ultimately, what matters is the accused’s decision to plead guilty or to proceed to trial, and not whether that decision is, to someone else, reckless or irrational. This framework is premised upon the view that judicial scrutiny must be directed to how the accused, and no one else, would have proceeded. But like all credibility determinations, the accused’s claim about what his or her subjective and fully informed choice would have been is measured against objective circumstances. Courts should therefore carefully scrutinize the accused’s assertion, looking to objective, circumstantial evidence to test its veracity against a standard of reasonable possibility. This approach strikes the proper balance between finality of guilty pleas and fairness to the accused. The accused need not show a viable defence to the charge in order to withdraw a plea on procedural grounds and requiring the accused to articulate a route to an acquittal is antithetical to the presumption of innocence and to the subjective nature of choosing to plead guilty.”


The accused, Mr. Wong, is a permanent resident, had pleaded guilty to cocaine trafficking and was sentenced to nine (9) months’ imprisonment without realizing this would automatically make him inadmissible to Canada and prevent him from appealing the inadmissibility. The majority from the Supreme Court held that the accused’s had filed an affidavit that failed to indicate that he would have proceeded differently had he known of the collateral immigration consequences and that therefore the plea could not be withdrawn. However, the Crown conceded a sentence of six (6) months less a day was appropriate and this would restore the accused’s right to appeal his inadmissibility.


The three-member dissent would have used a “modified objective” test: whether a reasonable person in the same situation as the accused would have proceeded differently had he or she been aware of the collateral consequences. The dissent stated:


The dissent’s modified objective approach to determine whether an accused has shown prejudice would not account for the fundamentally subjective and deeply personal nature of the decision to plead guilty. Pleading guilty is the decision of the accused, not a reasonable accused, or someone like the accused. To permit reviewing courts to substitute their own view of what someone in the accused’s circumstances would have done is to run a serious risk of doing injustice to that accused. A modified objective framework focusses upon what a judicially constructed hypothetical person would do, instead of how the particular accused would have proceeded. Furthermore, this approach would likely be difficult for lower courts to apply. Given the highly contextual and even idiosyncratic nature of factors that influence important decisions, adopting a standard based on what a hypothetical reasonable person who need not be presumed to have taken the best or single most rational course of action would have done effectively confers upon reviewing courts unbounded discretion to reach whatever conclusion they see fit. The modified objective framework also adopts a variable standard of scrutiny, not tied to a particular accused, but rather to a reasonable person. However, different accused, even different similarly situated accused, may ascribe varying levels of significance to different collateral consequences. Thus, a modified objective approach risks resulting in vacated guilty pleas even where there is no evidence that the accused personally would have done something differently. Even further, an accused who admits under crossexamination that he or she would have proceeded identically would still be entitled to withdraw his or her plea if a reasonable accused in his or her circumstances would withdraw the plea. This would impose unnecessary and substantial demands on a criminal justice system that is already overburdened.

This case illustrates the importance of ensuring that sufficient representations are made to a court when an application is made to vacate a guilty plea.  If you are facing similar circumstances, call Mr. J.S. Patel, Criminal Lawyer at 403-585-1960.

“Bail Pending Appeal” and securing release from custody after a conviction has been entered: recent cases.

Criminal bail hearings, Bail at Appeal,
Bail Hearings, Bail Pending Appeal, Criminal Bail Hearings, Urgent Criminal Defence Lawyers

What is Bail Pending Appeal?


If you have been convicted of a Criminal Code offence or of an offence under an Act of Parliament resulting in a jail term, an application can be made to secure judicial interim release (i.e. Bail) pending the outcome of your appeal.   It is critical to note, that the criminal law standards for securing bail are elevated, primarily due to the loss of the presumption of innocence due to the entry of the conviction.  Section 679(3) of the Criminal Code allows a judge of a court of appeal to order the release of an offender who has appealed his (or her) conviction “if the appellant establishes that (a) the appeal … is not frivolous; (b) he will surrender himself into custody in accordance with the terms of the order; and (c) his detention is not necessary in the public interest.” There are two (2) components to the last criterion. The offender must establish that he or she is not a threat to public safety – the offender will not commit a criminal offence while on bail – and that a reasonable person who is thoughtful, dispassionate, informed and respectful of society’s fundamental values would not lose confidence in the administration of justice if the appeal court released the applicant.  
In determining the public interest involves the balancing of great many factors. Some were listed in Regina v McNaughton, 2010 ABCA 97at para. 12, 26 Alta LR (5th) 126: Without attempting to compile a complete list, some of the factors that are relevant to the exercise of the jurisdiction include:  
  • ensuring fairness in the appeal process, to avoid the prospect of the applicant serving a sentence when the appeal is ultimately allowed (Charter of Rights, s. 11(e); Farinacciat paras. 43, 48; v. Fox, 2000 ABCA 283, 8 M.V.R. (4th) 1 at paras. 18-9; R. v. Colville, 2003 ABCA 133, 327 A.R. 143 at para. 12);
 
  • the fact of conviction, and the public importance of respecting the trial decision and the trial process (Nguyen[ (1997), 97 BCAC 86, 119 CCC (3d) 269] at para.18; Farinacciat para. 41; v. Rhyason, 2006 ABCA 120, 57 Alta. L.R. (4th) 31, 208 C.C.C. (3d) 193);
 
  • the apparent strength of the grounds for appeal, recognizing that it is not the role of the bail judge to resolve the merits ( v. Heyden(1999), 127 O.A.C. 190, 141 C.C.C. (3d) 570 at paras. 7-8, 12; Rhyasonat paras. 13-18; Colvilleat para. 16);
 
  • the standard of review that will be applied by the appeal court ( v. Sagoo, 2009 ABCA 357, 464 A.R. 258 at para. 9);
 
  • any risk that the applicant will reoffend if released (Nguyenat para. 7; Foxat paras.18, 20-21);
 
  • the applicant’s history of compliance with court orders and legally imposed conditions;
 
  • whether the applicant was released pending trial, and if so if his release was uneventful;
 
  • whether conditions of release could be crafted that would protect the public interest;
 
  • the seriousness of the charges, reflected in the severity of the sentence, although no class of offence is excluded from release (Nguyenat paras. 13, 20-24; Heydenat para. 12; v. R.D.L.(1995), 178 A.R. 142 at para. 5);
 
  • the effect on the perception of the administration of justice if the applicant is released, including the perception of an informed and reasonable member of society (Nguyenat paras. 25-6; Rhyasonat para. 20; Foxat para. 18; Colvilleat para. 17);
 
  • the status and state of readiness of the appeal (Farinacciat paras. 44, 48; Heydenat para. 12; D.L.at paras. 5, 12).
It cannot be said that the presence or absence of any one of those factors is determinative of the public interest, or of the eligibility of the appellant for release pending appeal: Regina v Gingras, 2012 BCCA 467 at para. 45, 293 CCC (3d) 100.

The Court of Appeal has recently considered two (2) cases that have considered the recent application of this rule:  R. v. C.L, infra, and R. v. B.G.  Each are discussed below:

Regina v. C.L, infra The Ontario of Court of Appeal dismissed the accused’s application for bail pending appeal. Following a judge-alone trial, the accused in this case was convicted of sexual assault and being unlawfully in a dwelling house.  As a consequence of the conviction and the outcome of the sentencing hearing, this accused person received a sentence of two (2) years less a day imprisonment plus two (2) years of probation.  His application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.  In dismissing the accused’s application, Trotter J.A. held that the public interest criterion was not met. This was because “[t]he materials filed fail to demonstrate that the grounds of appeal have sufficient strength to overcome the serious enforceability considerations present in this case” (at para. 21).     The Ontario Court of Appeal took umbrage with accused’s new charges of breach of recognizance, combined with his failure to mention them in his bail pending appeal affidavits.  The Court stated that it did not inspire confidence about compliance with any bail pending appeal order that might be made. Justice Trotter stated as follows (at para. 13): “The new criminal charges should have been disclosed. Judges of this court rely heavily on the trustworthiness of affidavits sworn in support of bail pending appeal applications. They are expected to be both accurate and complete     Regina v. B.G, Infra, In Regina and B.G., 2018 ONCA 455 (RD), Justice Brown of the Ontario Court of Appeal, granted the accused’s application for bail pending appeal from his conviction for child pornography and sexual offences. The trial judge found that the accused had taken and distributed photographs depicting his young daughter naked. The Crown opposed the application on the grounds that the public interest criterion was not met. The public interest criterion in s. 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code consists of two components: public safety and public confidence in the administration of justice: R v. Oland, 2017 SCC 17, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 250, at paras. 23 & 26. The public confidence criterion requires balancing several factors: the seriousness of the offence; the strength of the grounds of appeal; public safety; and flight risks: Oland, at paras. 37- Justice Brown held as follows:   [12]       The offences of which the applicant was convicted are very serious, involving as they do a vulnerable young child. However, when that factor is weighed with the remaining factors under the Oland public interest test – the strength of the grounds of appeal, no flight risk, and no threat to public safety – on balance, reviewability is favoured over enforceability.   “The offences of which the applicant was convicted are very serious, involving as they do a vulnerable young child. However, when that factor is weighed with the remaining factors under the Oland public interest test – the strength of the grounds of appeal, no flight risk, and no threat to public safety – on balance, reviewability is favoured over enforceability.”

These cases demonstrate the importance of the benefits of a properly prepared bail application (affidavits and arguments).  The procedure in securing bail prior to trial differs markedly when a conviction has been entered and a person has been remanded into custody.

If you have been convicted of a criminal code offence and you are seeking bail, contact Mr. J.S. Patel, Barrister at 403-585-1960 to secure a telephone consultation.  


 

Section 10(b) and the Rights to Counsel and the Police Obligations to _Hold Off_

July 23, 2017 What are the obligations imposed on the police to “hold-off” on collecting evidence against an accused person?  This was recently considered by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R.  v.  Fountain, 2017 ONCA 596
What obligations are imposed on the Police to have the requisite knowledge of the law regarding their core duties under Section 10(b) of the Charter (rights to counsel) when a person changes their mind or is ambiguous about speaking to counsel without delay?  There is an implicit requirement to “Hold off” in collecting evidence and a reasonable opportunity to speak to counsel must be afforded to a detainee, if they are reasonable diligent.  If section 10(b) of the Charter has been violated, should the evidence leading to the conviction have been excluded from the trial; and an acquittal entered. 

In general terms, the right to counsel is protected under Section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”).  While there have been granular developments in the breadth and scope of the jurisprudence defining that section, there are three (3) duties that are imposed on the police to ensure that one’s fundamental rights that are guaranteed under that section.  Those duties require the police to:

  • to inform the detainee of his or her right to retain and instruct counsel without delay and of the existence and availability of Legal Aid and duty counsel;
  • if a detainee has indicated a desire to exercise this right, to provide the detainee with a reasonable opportunity to exercise the right (except in urgent and dangerous circumstances); and
  • to refrain from eliciting evidence from the detainee until he or she has had that reasonable opportunity (again, except in cases of urgency or danger).

The Ontario Court of Appeal in Regina v. Fountain, 2017 ONCA 596 focused on the scope of the third (3rd) duty: the requirement to “hold off” collecting (or the legal parlance, conscripting) evidence against an person detained in police custody.  Confusion often arises when a person is unclear relative to whether counsel ought to be consulted immediately or at a later juncture.

At that critical moment, the Police/State is obligated to warn the detainee.  This is called a Propser warning.   The purpose of that Prosper warning is meant to alert a detainee to the fact that the “hold off” period in using him as a source of evidence is suspended upon his change of mind (implicitly or explicitly) with respect to wanting to speak to counsel without delay.  What’s more, that warning is intended to communicate to the detainee that, should he or shewish to seek legal advice, now that he is better informed, a reasonable opportunity to do so is required, under s. 10(b) of the Charter, to be afforded to him without delay.  This applies even if the detainee has changed of mind about wanting to speak to counsel.This is the essence of the Propsper warner and it was articulated by the late Justice Lamer in these terms:

I find that an additional informational obligation on police will be triggered once a detainee, who has previously asserted the right to counsel, indicates that he or she has changed his or her mind and no longer wants legal advice. At this point, the police are required to tell the detainee of his right to a reasonable opportunity to contact a lawyer and of the obligation on the part of the police during this time not to take any statements or require the detainee to participate in any potentially incriminating process until he or she has had that reasonable opportunity.”

This was not done in Regina v. Fountain; and Mr. Fountain’s rights to counsel were breached by a detective in Ontario. The recitation of the facts by the Court are:

[35]      Specifically, after Mr. Fountain had been waiting in custody for approximately six and a half hours, Det. Dellipizzi took Mr. Fountain to the interview room. Det. Dellipizzi then explained that efforts to reach Mr. Aitken had failed but that a lawyer would be present the next day at Mr. Fountain’s bail hearing. Mr. Fountain suggested he would wait until morning. Without in any way indicating that it would be problematic for Mr. Fountain to wait to speak to his lawyer, Det. Dellipizzi offered Mr. Fountain the following options:

Dellipizzi: Um, okay. So, you – what do you want to do? You want to just wait till the morning or…

Fountain: Yes.

Dellipizzi: … do you want somebody called? Okay.

[36]      When Mr. Fountain was offered the binary option of calling a legal aid lawyer now or waiting until the next day to speak to his own lawyer he would have had no reason to suspect that he would be forfeiting the “hold off” protection he had been enjoying, should he chose the latter option. Mr. Fountain was entitled to proceed as though either choice was reasonable. In this context, there was therefore nothing unreasonable in Mr. Fountain opting to wait until the next day.

[37]      Indeed, rather than demonstrating a lack of reasonable diligence on the part of Mr. Fountain, the way in which Mr. Fountain came to choose to speak to his lawyer the next morning reinforces the importance of a Prosper warning. As explained, the purpose of a Prosper warning is to ensure that detainees know what they are giving up when they abandon their efforts to speak to counsel without delay. If a detainee is not advised that they will lose a constitutional protection if they choose an offered option, that offer can operate as a trap. If Det. Dellipizzi was going to treat an option he was offering Mr. Fountain as authority to begin using Mr. Fountain as a source of evidence before he had spoken to a lawyer, Det. Dellipizzi should have told Mr. Fountain this. Yet he did not do so.

[38]      In these circumstances, Mr. Fountain’s decision to decline duty counsel and wait until the next day cannot fairly be taken as exhibiting an absence of reasonable diligence, and the trial judge erred by treating it as such

When obtained in violation of the right to counsel, statements will generally be excluded pursuant to a Section 24(2) analysis that stems from Regina v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, at paras. 95 and 96.  However, the Court noted, by way of general legal principles, that if a detainee is not reasonably diligent in exercising the right to counsel, the right to receive a Prosper warning at the time will also be lost. This means that the police would not be encumbered with the requirement to advise a detainee of what he will lose, if he waives his right to consult counsel without delay where the detainee has already forfeited that right by not being reasonably diligent in exercising it.  The Court found that Mr. Fountain was reasonablu diligent; and it entered an acquittal, by allowing his appeal against his conviction on four (4) counts of armed robbery, four (4) counts of forcible confinement and breaking and entering. After a judge alone trial, the accused was found to be a party to a home invasion robbery during which drugs and electronics were stolen and the four occupants were tied up and threatened with a gun. He was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment.

Importantly, the Court found that when the accused said that he wanted to wait until the next day to speak to a lawyer, this ought to have telegraphed (signaled) a change of mind to the Detective, from his earlier insistence on speaking with a lawyer at that time. That officer should have provided the detainee with a Prosper warning before delving into his questioning.  Mr. Fountain did not know what he would be giving up.  Thus, it could not be inferred that he waived his right to consult counsel without delay. Further, by choosing to wait to speak with his lawyer the following day, he was not attempting to impede the investigation or signal that he was not serious about wanting to consult counsel without delay. He was simply selecting one of two (2) options that were put to him. Given these circumstances, his decision to decline duty counsel and wait until the next day could not fairly be taken as exhibiting an absence of reasonable diligence, and the trial judge erred by making that finding. The evidence targeted for exclusion was crucial to the Crown’s were the statements made by the detainee prior to his consultation with duty counsel were the core feature of the Crown’s case. Without it, the prosecution fails. Given the seriousness of the breach, the impact on Mr. Fountain, and the effect on the administration of justice, the statements should have been excluded according to the Court of Appeal.  It averred tat the Prosper case has been the law since 1994. If the officer was aware of the law, he should have followed it. If he was not aware of the law pertaining to a core Charter duty, he should have been.  At paragraphs 64-65, Court emphasized the scope of the Police’s obligations to be aware of the law:

[63]      While Det. Dellipizzi presented as being careful to ensure that he did not violate Mr. Fountain’s right to counsel, and attempted to facilitate that right on more than one occasion, good faith involves much more than good intentions. Prosper has been the law since 1994. It is not an obscure decision addressing a rare event. It is a long-standing precedent governing not only a ubiquitous investigative technique – the police interview – but every case where the police use a detained suspect as a source of evidence.

[64]      As Rosenberg J.A. pointed out in Smith, at para. 384, “Prosper instructs the courts to be sensitive to the rights of an accused who it is alleged has waived his rights.” The same instruction has been given by the Supreme Court to police officers, who are expected to be educated about their core Charter duties. Where an officer aware of this body of law is presented with someone who has been insisting on their right to counsel and the officer concludes that they have apparently changed their mind after efforts to reach counsel have been frustrated, the officer should take the necessary steps to ensure that the waiver was real and informed. That did not happen. If Det. Dellipizzi was aware of the law, he should have followed it. If he was not aware of the law, he should have been.

This case is critical in factual circumstances that are imbued with Section 10(b) considerations because it tills the jurisprudence one step further that crystalizing the remedy available to detainees when the police and crown evidence demonstrates a lack of knowledge, either explicitly or inferentially, on a core right under the Charter.

   

Section 11(b) of the Charter and the Law on a Stay of Proceedings – What are “transitional circumstances” and general information on calculating the “net-delay” by J.S. Patel, Calgary and Toronto Criminal Lawyer.

June 25, 2017 Section 11(b) of the Charter and the Law on a Stay of Proceedings – What are “transitional circumstances” and general information on calculating the “net-delay”  by J.S. Patel, Calgary and Toronto Criminal Lawyer.   Contact J.S. Patel, Barrister at 403-585-1960 (Calgary) or 1-888-695-2211 (Toronto)

In Regina v. Cody, 2017 SCC 31 the Supreme Court of Canada revisited the legal and analytical framework for assessing the rights of a criminal defendant in the context of unreasonable delays in bringing the matters to trial(s).  As stated in the previous posts, the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 for assessing claims of unreasonable delay under s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”).   In Jordan the court set out two (2) presumptive ceilings: 18 months for provincial court cases, and 30 months for superior court cases. The issue of “net delay” is critical to that assessment.  If the total delay minus defence delay exceeds the applicable presumptive ceiling, then the delay is presumptively unreasonable.  At that point, the Crown can rebut this presumption by demonstrating “exceptional circumstances.”   Those circumstances are described in Jordan.   What is more, where charges pre-date Jordan and the delay remains presumptively unreasonable after deducting defence delay and accounting for exceptional circumstances, the Crown may demonstrate that the “transitional exceptional circumstance” justifies the delay.

The Crown prosecutors had argued in Cody  sought to modified the Jordan framework notwithstanding it’s recent pronouncement of the same.  The Supreme Court declined to modify the Jordan framework. The court stated that, properly applied, the current framework “provides sufficient flexibility and accounts for the transitional period of time that is required for the criminal justice system to adapt” (at para. 3). The court also clarified some of the principles set out in Jordan.

The Court Cody, supra, summarized the following concerning defence delays at paragraphs 26-43: [26]                        Defence delay is divided into two components: (1) “delay waived by the defence”; and (2) “delay that is caused solely by the conduct of the defence” (Jordan, at paras. 61 and 63) [27]                        A waiver of delay by the defence may be explicit or implicit, but must be informed, clear and unequivocal (Jordan, at para. 61). In this case, it is undisputed that Mr. Cody expressly waived 13 months of delay. Accounting for this reduces the net delay to approximately 47.5 month [28]                         In broad terms, the second component is concerned with defence conduct and is intended to prevent the defence from benefitting from “its own delay-causing action or inaction” (Jordan, at para. 113). It applies to any situation where the defence conduct has “solely or directly” caused the delay (Jordan, at para. 66). [29]                         However, not all delay caused by defence conduct should be deducted under this component. In setting the presumptive ceilings, this Court recognized that an accused person’s right to make full answer and defence requires that the defence be permitted time to prepare and present its case. To this end, the presumptive ceilings of 30 months and 18 months have “already accounted for [the] procedural requirements” of an accused person’s case (Jordan, at para. 65; see also paras. 53 and 83). For this reason, “defence actions legitimately taken to respond to the charges fall outside the ambit of defence delay” and should not be deducted (Jordan, at para. 65). [30]                         The only deductible defence delay under this component is, therefore, that which: (1) is solely or directly caused by the accused person; and (2) flows from defence action that is illegitimate insomuch as it is not taken to respond to the charges. As we said in Jordan, the most straightforward example is “[d]eliberate and calculated defence tactics aimed at causing delay, which include frivolous applications and requests” (Jordan, at para. 63). Similarly, where the court and Crown are ready to proceed, but the defence is not, the resulting delay should also be deducted (Jordan, at para. 64). These examples were, however, just that — examples.  They were not stated in Jordan, nor should they be taken now, as exhaustively defining deductible defence delay. Again, as was made clear in Jordan, it remains “open to trial judges to find that other defence actions or conduct have caused delay” warranting a deduction (para. 64). [31]                         The determination of whether defence conduct is legitimate is “by no means an exact science” and is something that “first instance judges are uniquely positioned to gauge” (Jordan, at para. 65).  It is highly discretionary, and appellate courts must show a correspondingly high level of deference thereto. While trial judges should take care to not second-guess steps taken by defence for the purposes of responding to the charges, they must not be reticent about finding defence action to be illegitimate where it is appropriate to do so. [32]                         Defence conduct encompasses both substance and procedure — the decision to take a step, as well as the manner in which it is conducted, may attract scrutiny. To determine whether defence action is legitimately taken to respond to the charges, the circumstances surrounding the action or conduct may therefore be considered. The overall number, strength, importance, proximity to the Jordan ceilings, compliance with any notice or filing requirements and timeliness of defence applications may be relevant considerations. Irrespective of its merit, a defence action may be deemed not legitimate in the context of a  11(b) application if it is designed to delay or if it exhibits marked inefficiency or marked indifference toward delay. [33]                         As well, inaction may amount to defence conduct that is not legitimate (Jordan, at paras. 113 and 121). Illegitimacy may extend to omissions as well as acts (see, for example in another context,  v. Dixon1998 CanLII 805 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 244, at para. 37). Accused persons must bear in mind that a corollary of the s. 11(b) right “to be tried within a reasonable time” is the responsibility to avoid causing unreasonable delay. Defence counsel are therefore expected to “actively advanc[e] their clients’ right to a trial within a reasonable time, collaborat[e] with Crown counsel when appropriate and . . . us[e] court time efficiently” (Jordan, at para. 138). [34]                         This understanding of illegitimate defence conduct should not be taken as diminishing an accused person’s right to make full answer and defence. Defence counsel may still pursue all available substantive and procedural means to defend their clients. What defence counsel are not permitted to do is to engage in illegitimate conduct and then have it count towards the Jordan  In this regard, while we recognize the potential tension between the right to make full answer and defence and the right to be tried within a reasonable time — and the need to balance both — in our view, neither right is diminished ‎by the deduction of delay caused by illegitimate defence conduct. [35]                         We stress that illegitimacy in this context does not necessarily amount to professional or ethical misconduct on the part of defence counsel. A finding of illegitimate defence conduct need not be tantamount to a finding of professional misconduct. Instead, legitimacy takes its meaning from the culture change demanded in Jordan.  All justice system participants — defence counsel included — must now accept that many practices which were formerly commonplace or merely tolerated are no longer compatible with the right guaranteed by  11(b) of the Charter. [36]                         To effect real change, it is necessary to do more than engage in a retrospective accounting of delay. It is not enough to “pick up the pieces once the delay has transpired” (Jordan, at para. 35). A proactive approach is required that prevents unnecessary delay by targeting its root causes. All participants in the criminal justice system share this responsibility (Jordan, at para. 137). [37]                         We reiterate the important role trial judges play in curtailing unnecessary delay and “changing courtroom culture” (Jordan, at para. 114). As this Court observed in Jordan, the role of the courts in effecting real change involves implementing more efficient procedures, including scheduling practices. Trial courts may wish to review their case management regimes to ensure that they provide the tools for parties to collaborate and conduct cases efficiently. Trial judges should make reasonable efforts to control and manage the conduct of trials. Appellate courts must support these efforts by affording deference to case management choices made by courts below. All courts, including this Court, must be mindful of the impact of their decisions on the conduct of trials. [para. 139] In scheduling, for example, a court may deny an adjournment request on the basis that it would result in unacceptably long delay, even where it would be deductible as defence delay. [38]                         In addition, trial judges should use their case management powers to minimize delay.  For example, before permitting an application to proceed, a trial judge should consider whether it has a reasonable prospect of success. This may entail asking defence counsel to summarize the evidence it anticipates eliciting in the voir dire and, where that summary reveals no basis upon which the application could succeed, dismissing the application summarily ( v. Kutynec (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 277 (C.A.), at pp. 287-89; R. v. Vukelich (1996), 1996 CanLII 1005 (BC CA), 108 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (B.C.C.A.)). And, even where an application is permitted to proceed, a trial judge’s screening function subsists: trial judges should not hesitate to summarily dismiss “applications and requests the moment it becomes apparent they are frivolous” (Jordan, at para. 63). This screening function applies equally to Crown applications and requests. As a best practice, all counsel — Crown and defence — should take appropriate opportunities to ask trial judges to exercise such discretion.  [39]                         Trial judges should also be active in suggesting ways to improve efficiency in the conduct of legitimate applications and motions, such as proceeding on a documentary record alone. This responsibility is shared with counsel.

The court also considered what constitutes “exceptional circumstances” (at paras. 44-66) and when the “transitional exceptional circumstance” may justify a presumptively unreasonable delay (at paras. 67-74):

[67]                          The new framework in Jordan applies to cases already in the system (Jordan, at para. 95). However, in some cases, the transitional exceptional circumstance may justify a presumptively unreasonable delay where the charges were brought prior to the release of Jordan (Jordan, at para. 96). This should be the final step in the analysis, taken only where, as here, the deduction of discrete events does not reduce the delay below the presumptive ceiling and excess delay cannot be justified based on case complexity.  [68]                          Like case complexity, the transitional exceptional circumstance assessment involves a qualitative exercise. It recognizes “the fact that the parties’ behaviour cannot be judged strictly, against a standard of which they had no notice” and that “change takes time” (Jordan, at paras. 96-97). The Crown may rely on the transitional exceptional circumstance if it can show that “the time the case has taken is justified based on the parties’ reasonable reliance on the law as it previously existed” (Jordan, at para. 96). Put another way, the Crown may show that it cannot be faulted for failing to take further steps, because it would have understood the delay to be reasonable given its expectations prior to Jordan and the way delay and the other factors such as the seriousness of the offence and prejudice would have been assessed under Morin. [69]                          To be clear, it is presumed that the Crown and defence relied on the previous law until Jordan was released. In this regard, the exceptionality of the “transitional exceptional circumstance” does not lie in the rarity of its application, but rather in its temporary justification of delay that exceeds the ceiling based on the parties’ reasonable reliance on the law as it previously existed (Jordan, at para. 96). The transitional exceptional circumstance should be considered in cases that were in the system before Jordan. The determination of whether delay in excess of the presumptive ceiling is justified on the basis of reliance on the law as it previously existed must be undertaken contextually and with due “sensitiv[ity] to the manner in which the previous framework was applied” (Jordan, at paras. 96 and 98). Under the Morin framework, prejudice and seriousness of the offence “often played a decisive role in whether delay was unreasonable” (Jordan, at para. 96). Additionally, some jurisdictions are plagued with significant and notorious institutional delays, which was considered under Morin as well (Jordan, at para. 97; Morin, at pp. 799-800).  For cases currently in the system, these considerations can inform whether any excess delay may be justified as reasonable (Jordan, at para. 96). [70]                          It is important to clarify one aspect of these considerations. This Court’s decision in R. v. Williamson, 2016 SCC 28 (CanLII), [2016] 1 S.C.R. 741, should not be read as discounting the important role that the seriousness of the offence and prejudice play under the transitional exceptional circumstance. The facts of Williamson were unusual, in that it involved a straightforward case and an accused person who made repeated efforts to expedite the proceedings, which efforts stood in contrast with the Crown’s indifference (paras. 26-29). Therefore, despite the seriousness of the offence and the absence of prejudice, the delay exceeding the ceiling could not be justified under the transitional exceptional circumstance. This highlights that the parties’ general level of diligence may also be an important transitional consideration. But the bottom line is that all of these factors should be taken into consideration as appropriate in the circumstances.  [71]                          When considering the transitional exceptional circumstance, trial judges should be mindful of what portion of the proceedings took place before or after Jordan was released. For aspects of the case that pre-dated Jordan, the focus should be on reliance on factors that were relevant under the Morin framework, including the seriousness of the offence and prejudice. For delay that accrues after Jordan was released, the focus should instead be on the extent to which the parties and the courts had sufficient time to adapt (Jordan, at para. 96).  [72]                          In this case, the entire proceedings at trial pre-dated the release of Jordan. The Crown must therefore show that the 36.5 months of net delay was justified in light of its reliance on the previous state of the law under Morin. 

The factual and legal assessment of a remedy under Section 11(b) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings resulting, effectively, in a dismissal of the charges against you, is a complicated factual and legal assessment; and legal counsel ought to be sought from experienced counsel.

Contact J.S. Patel, Barrister at 403-585-1960 (Calgary) or 1-888-695-2211 (Toronto)

*** The opinions expressed in this Blog are not a substitute for full and through legal advice. It is not meant to be used a fulsome account of entire decision and area of law discussed.