Tag Archives: criminal lawyers calgary.

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The Crown’s Duty to Inquired under Regina v. McNeil 2009 SCC 3

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  The Court of Appeal in Regina v. Esseghaier, 2021 ONCA 162 had occasion to consider the scope of the Crown’s duty to inquire about disclosure held by a third party policing agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the “FBI”)).  The Ontario Court of Appeal addressed some preliminary issues regarding a disclosure application brought by the defendants who were convicted of terrorism offences following a jury trial and sentenced to life imprisonment. The appealed raised a number of grounds. It was allowed.  A new trial was ordered on the ground that the trial judge made an error in the jury selection process (2019 ONCA 672). The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown’s appeal, restored the convictions, and remitted the remaining grounds of appeal to the Court of Appeal for determination (2021 SCC 9).  However, in November 2020, the appellants filed a notice of application under s.683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code,requesting an order directing the Crown to obtain and disclose certain information from the FBI . The disclosure application related to a purported communication between the trial judge and the handler for an FBI agent who was a witness at the defendants’ trial. The narrow issue at appeal was whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.  The defendants wished to advance the appeal on that basis. The Crown brought a motion for directions and requested that the application for disclosure be summarily dismissed. The court declined to summarily dismiss the disclosure application. The court held that although there was much to be said for the Crown’s position that the alleged communication was not capable of giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, it was premature to advance that argument at this stage. The court also held that, at this stage, it did not need to resolve the issue of whether or not the court could compel the Crown to have a willsay or affidavit created. The court stated that, pursuant to Regina v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3, the Crown had a duty to ask the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to make inquiries about whether the alleged communication occurred. The court ordered the Crown to take further steps to obtain the requested disclosure. The Court stated at para 27: [27]      The Crown’s obligation is to make proper inquiries. While the Crown properly asked the RCMP to inquire as to whether Agent El Noury or Nelly had contemporaneous notes or memory aids in respect of the communications, the Crown did not ask for information about the obvious question: did the alleged communication occur? From the outset, the responding parties have been asking for an answer to that question in the form of a willsay or affidavit. While we would not at this stage order that the information be provided in either of those formats, leaving the argument of that matter to another day should the need arise, it is time for the Crown to meet its disclosure obligations and ask the RCMP to make inquiries about: (a) whether the alleged communication between Nelly and the trial judge, as recounted in Agent El Noury’s book, or some similar type of communication, took place and, if so, whether there are any notes, electronic or otherwise, making reference to that communication? (b) whether the alleged communication between Nelly and Agent El Noury, as recounted in Agent El Noury’s book, or some similar type of communication, took place and, if so, whether there are any notes, electronic or otherwise, making reference to that communication?
If you have been charged with a criminal offence and require a consultation, call Mr. J.S. Patel at 403-585-1960.

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The Credibility of Confidential Informants and Challenging the Information to Obtain a Search Warrant.

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Confidential Informants and the sufficiency of information in a warrant.
The Credibiity of Confidential Informants in Reviewing a Informaiton to Obtain a Warrant to Search a home

The credibility of a confidential informant is very important to the state’s case when endeavoring to uphold a warrant authorizing a search that is critical to the entire prosecution case.  An accused person’s conviction was overturned recently by the Court of Appeal in Regina v. Herta, 2018 ONCA 927where the entire case for the Prosecution Service hinged on the credibility of a confidential informant.   The Court permitted Mr. Herta’s appeal of his unsuccessful motion under Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms at trial, excluded the drug evidence, and entered acquittals on all counts.  The critical issue was the Information to Obtain the search warrant of a home. The critical issue was the Information to Obtain the search warrant of a home under the seminal authority of Reginav. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13;

The standard exacted, to review the warrant and ITO,  is one of credibly-based probability, and requires proof of reasonable probability or reasonable belief.  This standard requires more than an experienced-based “hunch” or reasonable suspicion, but it does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or even the establishment of a prima facie case.  In short, if the inferences of criminal conduct and the recovery of evidence are reasonable on the facts disclosed in the ITO, then the search warrant could have been issued.

In this case, the search of his home arose from the fact that an individual wanted by police (DC) was seen arriving there.  The Information to Obtain (the “ITO”) the search warrant contained references from a confidential informant that this individual “DC” was armed.  Consequently, the police obtained a search warrant for the house, which did not reveal a gun, but led police to find several illicit CDSA substances that formed the basis of the charges before the Provincial Court.

The Court of Appeal made it very clear that the indexed search warrant, in this case, rose or fell on the strength of the confidential informant’s tip; and consequently the Crown’s case.   However, the trial judge was not tasked with a step six analysis from Regina v. Garofoli, 1990 CanLII 52 (S.C.C.).   When reviewing a judicial authorization, the relevant question is not whether the reviewing Court would have granted the order. The question on review is whether or not the order could have issued. The test in this regard was set out by Sopinka J. in Garofoli, supra, as follows:

The reviewing judge does not substitute his or her view for that of the authorizing judge. If, based on the record which was before the authorizing judge as amplified on the review, the reviewing judge concludes that the authorizing judge could have granted the authorization, then he or she should not interfere. In this process, the existence of fraud, non-disclosure, misleading evidence and new evidence are all relevant, but, rather than being a prerequisite to review, their sole impact is to determine whether there continues to be any basis for the decision of the authorizing judge.

In Reginav. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8 (CanLII), the Supreme Court of the Canada articulated the standard of review in these terms:

In reviewing the sufficiency of a warrant application, however, “the test is whether there was reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed on the basis of which the authorization could have issued” (R. v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992 (S.C.C.), at para. 54 (emphasis in original)). The question is not whether the reviewing court would itself have issued the warrant, but whether there was sufficient credible and reliable evidence to permit a justice of the peace to find reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence had been committed and that evidence of that offence would be found at the specified time and place.

This is notwithstanding the fact there were heavy redactions in the ITO.  However, since the redacted ITO did not contain objective facts supporting the informant’s credibility, no confidence could be safely placed in his/her information. What is more, insufficient corroborative evidence was present to justify the belief that DC was in the residence with a gun. The confirmatory information available related to things that many people would know about this person: DC.

Finally, the confidential informant’s tip was not sufficiently compelling. This is because it did not connect DC’s possession of a gun to the residence in question; and there was nothing in in the ITO that connected DC to the residence. The ITO was also potentially misleading by suggesting that DC lived at the house.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court could not support the warrant and that the accused’s s.8 Charterrights were breached.

As such, the Court engaged in a s. 24(2) Charter analysis as required by Regina v. Grant2009 SCC 32 (SCC).  It ruled that the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused weighed heavily in favour of exclusion, given the highly invasive nature of the search. Despite the importance of society’s interest in the adjudication of this case on the merits, the exclusion of evidence was warranted.  Acquittals were entered on this basis.

If you have been charged with a drug related offence involving the use of Search Warrant by the police, call Mr. J.S. Patel, Barrister for a consultation:  403-585-1960.

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An example of a flaw credibility assessment of testimony in a sexual assault cases results in a conviction being overturned on appeal

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Sexual Offences and Credibility - How Credibility is Assessed in Criminal Trials
Sexual Assault and Credibility findings in a Criminal Trial: How Credibility can be assessed in Criminal Trials in Canada

In Reginav. J.L., 2018 ONCA 756the OntarioCourt of Appeal set aside the accused’s conviction for sexual assault and ordered a new trial  At trial, the case that turned largely on credibility.  This case is just one example  of a flaw credibility assessment of testimony in a sexual assault cases results in a conviction being overturned on appeal

The accused was convicted of sexually assaulting the complainant at a dance. . The key issues raised in this conviction appeal are (a) the sufficiency of the trial judge’s reasons, (b) whether he properly relied on a behavioural assumption, and (c) on the complainant’s post-occurrence demeanour in convicting the appellant. This case is a good example of the subtleties that may be unearthed in cross-examination during the course of the trial that may not be transparent prior to the commencement of the same.

The Court of Appeal agreed and found that the trial judge did not engage in any analysis of the testimony of the complainant and the accused other than to note “inconsistencies and many lapses of memory.”  In fact, the judge essentially relied on two (2) facts to explain why the complainant’s version of the events accepted, namely that: (i) she did not consent to sexual contact; and (ii) that the accused pressed on with attempted intercourse: the complainant’s demeanour after the incident and the finding that it “defied common sense” that a young woman would go outside in a dress in mid-December and consent to sexual activity on the ground.

The court held that the trial judge failed to consider the similarities in the complainant’s emotional state before and after the alleged assault. Her physical state was also consistent with the possibility of having engaged in consensual sexual activity. The trial judge’s assumption about what a “young woman” would or would not do could not be taken as a fact, and yet the trial judge relied on it to reject the accused’s evidence. There was a danger that this reasoning affected the trial judge’s conclusion as to whether the Crown had proven its case.  The Appellate Court stated the following in relevant part:

[46]      The second basis for the trial judge’s conclusion depended on an assumption about what a “young woman” will and will not do. As mentioned, the trial judge said: “I cannot accept that a young woman would go outside wearing a dress in mid-December, lie down in dirt, gravel and wet grass and engage in consensual sexual activity.”  In other words, the trial judge could not accept, or even have a doubt arising from, the appellant’s evidence because the trial judge was of the view that, young women would not do what the complainant was said to have consensually done.  There is a real danger that this reasoning contributed to the trial judge’s assessment of whether, on the whole of the evidence, the Crown had proven the appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. I do not share the trial judge’s view that it can be taken as a fact that no young woman would consensually engage in the alleged behaviour.

[47]      Although trial judges must exercise common sense when making credibility findings and resolving what actually happened in a case, relying upon assumptions about what young women will and will not do may impact a judge’s objective deliberation of the reasonable doubt standard. In R. v. Mah, 2002 NSCA 99 (CanLII), [2002] N.S.J. No. 349, at para. 75, Cromwell J.A. (as he then was) stated:  “Assumptions about the ways of the world appear to have contributed to the judge’s failure to give proper consideration to the question of whether, on the whole of the evidence, he had a reasonable doubt”. Here, by relying on an assumption regarding what young women will and will not do, as if it were a fact, and in light of the centrality of that assumption to the trial judge’s reasoning, his finding of guilt was tainted by error.

Again, this case is a good example of the subtleties that may be unearthed in cross-examination during the course of the trial that may not be transparent prior to the commencement of the same.

If you have been charged or are about to be charged with sexual assault under section 271 of the Criminal Code of Canada, contact Mr. J. S. Patel, Criminal Lawyer in Calgary  or Toronto at 403-585-1960 for an initial consultation.  

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Removal or Withdrawal of Counsel from the Record for Ethical Reasons or Non-Payment of Fees, cases from 2018

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The Ontario Court of Appeal has recently ruled on the counsel’s ability to be withdrawn on counsel of record.  The starting point for any analysis stems from the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Regina v. Cunningham, [2010] 1 SCR 331, 2010 SCC 10 (CanLII) where the Court laid out the following principles to guide the Courts when it hears applications by accused persons and counsel to be withdrawn as counsel of record:  

[47] If counsel seeks to withdraw far enough in advance of any scheduled proceedings and an adjournment will not be necessary, then the court should allow the withdrawal.  In this situation, there is no need for the court to enquire into counsel’s reasons for seeking to withdraw or require counsel to continue to act.

 [48] Assuming that timing is an issue, the court is entitled to enquire further.  Counsel may reveal that he or she seeks to withdraw for ethical reasons, non-payment of fees, or another specific reason (e.g. workload of counsel) if solicitor-client privilege is not engaged.  Counsel seeking to withdraw for ethical reasons means that an issue has arisen in the solicitor-client relationship where it is now impossible for counsel to continue in good conscience to represent the accused.  Counsel may cite “ethical reasons” as the reason for withdrawal if, for example, the accused is requesting that counsel act in violation of his or her professional obligations (see, e.g., Law Society of Upper Canada, r. 2.09(7)(b), (d); Law Society of Alberta, c. 14, r. 2; Law Society of British Columbia, c. 10, r. 1), or if the accused refuses to accept counsel’s advice on an important trial issue (see, e.g., Law Society of Upper Canada, r. 2.09(2); Law Society of Alberta, c. 14, r. 1; Law Society of British Columbia, c. 10, r. 2).  If the real reason for withdrawal is non-payment of legal fees, then counsel cannot represent to the court that he or she seeks to withdraw for “ethical reasons”.  However, in either the case of ethical reasons or non-payment of fees, the court must accept counsel’s answer at face value and not enquire further so as to avoid trenching on potential issues of solicitor-client privilege.

[49] If withdrawal is sought for an ethical reason, then the court must grant withdrawal (see C. (D.D.), at p. 328, and Deschamps, at para. 23).  Where an ethical issue has arisen in the relationship, counsel may be required to withdraw in order to comply with his or her professional obligations.  It would be inappropriate for a court to require counsel to continue to act when to do so would put him or her in violation of professional responsibilities.

 [50] If withdrawal is sought because of  non-payment of legal fees,  the court may exercise its discretion to refuse counsel’s request.  The court’s order refusing counsel’s request to withdraw may be enforced by the court’s contempt power (C. (D.D.), at p. 327).  In exercising its discretion on the withdrawal request, the court should consider the following non-exhaustive list of factors:

   
  1. whether it is feasible for the accused to represent himself or herself;
  2. other means of obtaining representation;
  3. impact on the accused from delay in proceedings, particularly if the accused is in custody;
  4. conduct of counsel, e.g. if counsel gave reasonable notice to the accused to allow the accused to seek other means of representation, or if counsel sought leave of the court to withdraw at the earliest possible time;
  5. impact on the Crown and any co‑accused;
  6. impact on complainants, witnesses and jurors;
  7. fairness to defence counsel, including consideration of the expected length and complexity of the proceedings;
  8. the history of the proceedings, e.g. if the accused has changed lawyers repeatedly.
  As these factors are all independent of the solicitor-client relationship, there is no risk of violating solicitor-client privilege when engaging in this analysis.  On the basis of these factors, the court must determine whether allowing withdrawal would cause serious harm to the administration of justice.  If the answer is yes, withdrawal may be refused.
In Regina v. Short, 2018 ONCA 1, the Ontario Court of Appeal ordered a new trial for first degree murder where the trial judge refused to let defence counsel off the record six (6) prior to the commencement of the trial proper.   Defence counsel made representations to the presiding judge that indicating that there was a “loss of confidence” between the accused person and himself.  That loss of confidence was such that counsel could not discharge his duties under the Law Society Rules because he could not ethically proceed.  The second ground cited by the defence lawyer was that he was not being paid by the client.  Finally, the defence counsel argued that “Counsel took immediate steps following such a loss of confidence in the relationship to prepare and file the Notice of Application.”  Trial counsel made representations to the trial judge in which he briefly outlined the history of his relationship with the appellant; again, he indicated he had not been paid and referred to the possibility of a lawsuit for payment of the funds owed to him. Counsel also advised the trial judge that because of the non-payment, he had been unable to do things that should have been done in preparation for the second trial.     The trial court considered these explanations but further queried defence counsel on the merits of the representations made and the materials filed, which perciepirated the following response by the Defence Lawyer:    

…I am telling Your Honour that there are issues that have arisen that result in a loss of confidence between Mr. Short and I…

…[A]nd I can tell you as an officer of the court, this is not me putting on top of a non-payment of fees, a paragraph that says there’s a loss of confidence just to get an easy way out. This is probably the most difficult decision I have done. In this particular case I have, without disclosing anything, done everything I can to move this case forward. After the second trial I wiped much of my calendar clean to get this second trial as quick as possible. Obviously, there were communications between my client and I that allowed me to make the decision to go forward, financially and for another, another, another, abound of reasons. But I am telling the [sic] today, is that having no funds, and not being able to disclose to you the communications between the client and I, that I cannot represent Mr. Short going forward. [Emphasis added.]

    It is also critical to note that the trial Court did not query the accused person because it was concerned about the possibility that confidential information would be related to the Court that would not have otherwise be the case if the application had not been made. The Crown Prosecutor objected to the application made by defence counsel.  Oddly, the Crown advised the Court that only payment issues were cited to the preclusion of ethical issues, suggesting that the defence counsel was camouflaging the true nature and merits of the application.  In accepting the Crown’s argument and rejecting defence counsel’s application to be removed as counsel of record, it stated:   Given the weight and tenor of the balance of the affidavit dwelling on financial issues, I am forced to conclude that the reference to ethics in the adverb “ethically” has no basis in evidence. I am persuaded that [trial counsel’s] difficulties relate to payment of his accounts and not to an ethical dilemma.[Emphasis added.]  
The Court of Appeal in Ontario held the trial judge was obligated to accept the defence counsel’s representations (as stated above) that the solicitor-client relationship had broken down; and should have accepted his application to be removed as counsel of record.  The failure to do so culminated in an error that rendered the trial unfair and created a miscarriage of justice. What is more, the trial court also erred by failing to hear from the accused as to whether he wanted to continue with the lawyer.
If you require the assistance of a defence lawyer, call J.S. Patel at 403-585-1960. However, please note that it is not our practice to discuss matters with potential clients when you currently have a lawyer.    

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Recent Developments in DUI Cases: The imposition of a lawful demands is not required for issues that arise under s. 258 – Criminal Code for DUIs or Over-80 matters.

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On July 6th, 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a DUI case, ruled that a police officer and the Crown is not required to establish reasonable and probable grounds for a lawful breath demand for the purposes of a Section 258 of the Criminal Code of Canada

In R. v. Alex, 2017 SCC 37 the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to consider whether sections 258(1)(c) and (g) of the Criminal Code of Canada (the “Code”) requires a police officer to have reasonable and probable grounds in order to make an evidentiary demand as a pre-condition governing the admissibility of the certificate of analysis, which captures the evidentiary breath readings of an accused person who has been charged for DUI or “Over-80”).  Mr. Alex’s Criminal Lawyers argued that the subsections of 258 of the Code imposes such a requirement.  Section 258(1)(g) establishes a statutory exception to the common law hearsay rule. It permits a certificate of analysis, which sets out the accused’s breath test results, to be filed for the truth of its contents without the need to call for oral evidence.   Section 258(1)(c) then provides two inferences that may be presumptively drawn from the certificate.

The first inference, referred to as the presumption of accuracy, is that the breath readings in the certificate are accurate measures of the accused’s blood-alcohol concentration. This presumption dispenses with the need to call the qualified technician who administered the tests to verify their accuracy.  The purpose of these evidentiary short-cuts, according to the Court, streamline the trial proceedings by permitting an accused’s blood-alcohol concentration at the time of the alleged offence to be presumptively proven through the filing of a certificate of analysis. These shortcuts, however, do not affect the issue of whether the accused’s breath readings are admissible or not. They only impact the manner of admission — specifically, whether the Crown must call two (2) additional witnesses: (i) one to verify the accuracy of the certificate and enter it as an exhibit, and (ii) to opine on the accused’s blood-alcohol concentration at the time of the alleged offence — matters which have no connection to the lawfulness of the breath demand. This was made clear in R. v. Deruelle, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 663, at pp. 673-74, where the Court observed that the breath readings remain admissible at common law through viva voce evidence, irrespective of whether the shortcuts apply.

Thus the central question for the Court was whether the opening words of each s. 258 evidentiary shortcut — “where samples of the breath of the accused have been taken pursuant to a demand made under subsection 254(3)” — refer specifically to a lawful demand made under s. 254(3), which among other things, is predicated on the police having reasonable grounds to make the demand.

The Majority decision of the Supreme Court of Canada decided that it doesn’t imposed such a requirement.  It used the modern principles of statutory interpretation to arrive at its conclusion. Parliament did not include the word “lawful” within section 258(1)(c) or (g) of the Criminal Code and when read in light of its over context, above and beyond the plain meaning of the sections, the lawfulness of the demand had no bearing on the manner in which the Certificate of Analysis, containing the blood-alcohol breath readings, could be introduced during a trial of a DUI matter.  Effectively, the Court found that it was lawfulness of a demand was not a condition precedent to the manner in which the Certificate of Analysis could be introduced.   It further consider that that Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms could be invoked, should a Criminal DUI lawyer decide to file the requisite notice to seek the exclusion of breath samples at trial by positing that they were inadmissible due to a breach of an accused’s persons right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure.

The Court further reasoned that if such a line of reasoning and logic were adopted as suggested by the Mr. Alex’s criminal lawyers,

“….in many cases, trial scheduling would have to account for the possibility that two (2) additional witnesses would be required to testify. This would extend estimated lengths of trial proceedings: one day trials would become two day trials, two day trials would become three days, and so on. In addition, the Crown would have to be prepared to call a breath technician and toxicologist in every case and limitations on their availability could add to the delay. And the effects do not end there. The consequences of trial scheduling are pervasive, creating backlogs and congestion throughout the justice system as a whole. This raises the following question: For what purpose? The answer, as I will explain, is none, other than to provide an accused with a hollow form of protection against police misconduct which the Charter now accounts for in a much more satisfactory and meaningful way.”

The majority decision appears to be in inline with the it’s recent judicial pronouncements in Regina v. Jordan and Regina v. Cody where in the Court set out the new rules and law under Section 11(b) of the Charter to ensure timely trials.

For more general information about DUI charges, please refer to our link on DUIs and Over 80 offences.

If you have been charged with DUI and Over-80, this case underscores the importance of ensure that your rights under Section 8 of the Canadian Charter or Rights and Freedoms are thoroughly canvassed to ensure that all possible defences undergird a Charter Notice (where applicable) and filed in the Court prior to your trial.  To make arrangements, for a free initial thirty (30) minute telephone consultation, during our regular office hours, please contact J.S. Patel, Criminal DUI Lawyer at 403-585-1960 (Calgary) or 1-888-695-2211 (Toronto).

  *** The opinions expressed in this Blog are not a substitute for full and through legal advice. It is not meant to be used a fulsome account of entire decision and area of law discussed. 

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Niagara Cheese Smuggler

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The “Niagara Cheese Smuggler”, a police officer in Ontario, sentenced to one-hundred and twenty (120) days in jail.

The accused/appellant was at the relevant times a police officer with the Niagara Regional Police. He was convicted of conspiracy to smuggle cheese into Canada from the United States without paying the required duties, and related charges (in contravention of the Customs Act), and of breach of trust by a public official (in contravention of the Criminal Code).  The scheme expanded and involved selling the cheese to local restaurants; it spanned three years. The constable never declared the cheese at the border, nor did he or the accused ever pay the required duty, which would have amounted to approximately $325,000

He was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment for the smuggling offences and to one month’s imprisonment, consecutive, on the breach of trust offence.  InRegina v.  Heron, 2017 ONCA 441, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the accused’s conviction for conspiring to smuggle cheese into Canada from the United States (in contravention of the Customs Act) and of breach of trust by a public official (in contravention of the Criminal Code ).  The accused’s scheme expanded, over the course of three (3) years; and involved selling the cheese to local restaurants in the Buffalo (USA) area.  The police officer in Niaragara never declared the cheese at the border, and did he or the accused did not ever pay the required duty, which would have amounted to approximately $325,000. After his friend advised that the police officer that thought he was being followed, the accused ran a CPIC check on the licence plate of the vehicle operated by his friend.  The Court upheld the sentencing judge’s comments in this regard at para. 27: “I also agree that the appellant’s resort to CPIC with a view to protecting his criminal interests, as best he could, constituted a serious breach of public trust in the circumstances.”

The Court further added:

The trial judge recognized that the appellant was a first-time offender.  However, the appellant is also a police officer holding a public office.  The public is entitled to expect honesty and not corruption in the members of its police forces.  In this case, as the trial judge noted, the crime was significantly aggravated by the fact that the appellant conspired with Cst. Purdie to have Cst. Purdie use his credentials as a police officer to move across the border without scrutiny in order to facilitate the scheme.  I agree with the trial judge that:

It sends a very discouraging message to the public to let them know that police officers can get away with profiting from abuse of their credentials.

This case clearly illustrates the extent in which state power can be abused for self-motivated purposes; and of equal importance to ensure that you or any commercial entity is aware of the applicable laws when engaging in transnational business activities that can attract criminal liability; and potential jail terms.  In this case, the Court of the Appeal upheld the decision of the sentencing judge given the breach of the public trust.

In these types of cases our office provides written opinions at a fair cost.  To retain our services, contact J.S. Patel , Criminal Lawyer at 403-585-1960 or 1-888-695-2211 during our regular business hours.