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The mandatory minimum punishment laws for the production of a controlled substance, contrary to Section 7(1) of the Controlled Drugs Substances Act, was struck down as unconstitutional by the Ontario of the Appeal.

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Unlawful Production of a Controlled Substance and Unconstitutional Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Drug Sentence Appeal Lawyers.
Section 7(1) of the Controlled Drugs Substances Act
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a decision of the Superior Court in striking down the mandatory minimums required under ‘Unauthorized Production” provisions of Section 7(1) of Controlled Drugs Substances Act (the “CDSA”).  InReginaand VU, 2018 ONCA 436, the Ontario Court of Appeal considered three (3) separate sentence appeals, from three (2) accused persons who had levied a challenge, through defence counsel, to the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentences for marijuana production under the CDSA. Each defendants, Pham, Vu, Li, were convicted of unauthorized production of marijuana under s.7(1) of the CDSA.  Criminal Defence counsel, at the sentencing stage, had filed an application under the Judicature Act to challenge the applicable mandatory minimum as contrary to s.12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as cruel and unusual punishment.  Each appeal is summarized below.
In the Regina v. Pham appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge’s ruling (which is reported at 2016 ONSC 5312) that the two (2)-year mandatory minimum under CDSA s.7(2)(b)(v) which involves the production of more than five hundred (500) plants was contrary to s.12.  That same order of juridical logic was applied to s.7(2)(b)(vi) (three-year minimum for production of more than five-hundred (500) plants where statutory aggravating factor applies. What is more, the ONCA also upheld the ruling, from the Sentencing Court, that the aggravating factor under CDSA s.7(3)(c), which is the production constituting a potential safety hazard in a residential area was unconstitutional.  In considering the application of the famed Reginav. Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103test, the highest Court in Ontario found that none of these provisions could be saved under s.1 of the Charter. The Court stated the following in relevant part:  
[83]      I do not accept these submissions. With respect to ss. 7(2)(b)(vi) and 7(3)(c), they ignore the fundamental finding that this three-year mandatory minimum can apply to persons who have no moral culpability in relation to the statutory aggravating factor. The provisions could have been tailored to avoid this result. They are neither minimally impairing nor proportionate. [84]      Similarly, with respect to s. 7(2)(b)(v), as the Pham sentencing judge noted, Parliament could have provided a safety valve to allow judges to grant exemptions in exceptional cases. Once again, the provisions are neither minimally impairing nor proportional.
The court also rejected the Crown’s argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that the impugned mandatory minimum provisions could be “read down” by inserting the words “if the production is for the purpose of trafficking” into each subsection.
In the Reginav. Vuappeal, the Ontario upheld Justice Durno striking down of the three (3) year minimum arising out of s.7(3)(c) of the CDSA(reported at 2015 ONSC 5834 and 2015 ONSC 7965), but set aside his ruling that the two (2) year minimum under s.7(2)(b)(v) was constitutional. The court held that its findings in the Phamappeal governed the constitutional issues in the Vu Appeal with equal force. Durno J. had also struck down the mandatory minimums under ss.7(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the CDSA (less than 201 and more than five plants). The accused had not been charged under these sections. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown that it was not open to the sentencing judge to declare invalid provisions not applicable to the accused. As a result, the Crown did not have an appeal route in relation to these declarations as they did not play a role in the sentencing decision and the court did not have to consider their constitutionality.
In the Li appeal, the court reversed the sentencing judge’s ruling (reported at 2016 ONSC 1757) and held that the 12-month mandatory minimum under s.7(2)(b)(iii) of the CDSA (production of more than 200 but less than 501 plants) violated s.12 of the Charter and could not be saved under s.1. The analysis and reasonable hypotheticals from the Pham appeal applied equally to this accused.  The Court concluded the case in the following terms at paragraphs 119 to 121:
[119]    In summary, I would dismiss the Crown’s appeal in Pham and uphold the declarations that ss. 7(2)(b)(v), (vi) and 7(3)(c) of the CDSA are unconstitutional. [120]    I would also dismiss the Crown’s appeal in Vu. My conclusion in respect of the Pham appeal governs the constitutional arguments in relation to ss. 7(2)(b)(v), (vi) and 7(3)(c). The Crown has not demonstrated that it has an appeal route to this court relating to their ss. 7(2)(b)(i) and (ii) argument as the declarations of invalidity in relation to those sections had no impact on the sentence Mr. Vu received. As Mr. Vu has now completed his sentence, I would dismiss his sentence appeal as moot. [121]    Finally, I would allow Mr. Li’s appeal. Based on my reasoning in the Pham appeal, I would hold that s. 7(2)(b)(iii) of the CDSA violates s. 12 of the Charter, cannot be saved by s. 1 and should be declared of no force and effect under s. 52 of the Constitution Act. I would reduce Mr. Li’s sentence from 12 months’ imprisonment to six months’ less one day.
This case demonstrates the importance the importance of considering the constitutionality of mandatory minimums before concede the statutorily imposed requirements in the Code.  A well-crafted section 12 Charterchallenge can make the difference between years of imprisonment and possibly a non-custodial term.
Call Mr. J.S. Patel, Barrister for a consultation, if you have been charged with producing a controlled substance under the CDSA:  403-585-1960.    

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A crushing sentence that was imposed by the sentencing judge was overturned, at appeal, by the Ontario Court of Appeal.

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Recently the Court of Appeal in Regina v.  Williams, 2018 ONCA 367the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the accused’s appeal against his twelve (12)-year sentence (less five years for time served) which was imposed, following his guilty plea, in response to convictions for drug and firearm offences arising out of two sets of charges.  He pled guilty to: 1)   Possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, 2)   Possession of cannabis for the purpose of trafficking, 3)  Carrying a concealed firearm, 4)  Possession of a restricted firearm with readily accessible ammunition, and 5)   Breach of recognizance (for possession of a firearm).

The trial court imposed what the Court of Appeal viewed as a crushing sentence, which precluding the prospects of rehabilitation, a valid sentencing objective.  The Court of Appeal stated:

 While the sentencing judge noted the appellant’s guilty pleas to the second set of charges in his narrative of events, his reasons do not indicate he took the guilty pleas into account in determining the appropriate sentence. Further, while the trial judge noted the appellant’s relative youth at the time of sentencing, his reasons do not indicate he took into account that the appellant was just 23 years of age and a first offender at the time of the first set of offences or that a first penitentiary sentence should be the shortest possible that achieves the relevant sentencing objectives. Finally, we are of the view the sentencing judge did not accord sufficient weight to the factor that the appellant should not be crushed by the sentence. In our view, the sentence imposed all but eliminates the appellant’s prospects for rehabilitation when considering the “Principles and Purposes of Sentencing”  in the Criminal Code of Canada.  While denunciation and deterrence are widely accepted as primary sentencing principles, section 718(d) clearly requires consideration to the issue of rehabilitation. 

The reasons for sentence did not indicate that the sentencing judge took into account the fact that the accused was only 23 years old and a first offender at the time of the first set of charges, or that a first penitentiary sentence should be the shortest possible sentence that achieves the relevant sentencing objectives.  Furthermore, the sentencing judge failed to sufficiently consider that the sentence should not be crushing to the accused.  The court reduced the sentence to nine years.

If you are seeking to appeal your conviction against your sentence, contact our law firm at 403-585-1960 and speak to J.S. Patel, Barrister.  We accept legal aid on a case by case basis and charge a consultation fee for a review of appellate matters.

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Police brutality and Excessive force in arresting an accused person through the use of a baton and pepper spray: Contact: J.S. Patel at 403-585-1960

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In Regina  v. Hines, 2018 ONCJ 197, the Ontario Court of Justice held the police used excessive force where, in the context of a “chaotic” situation, they struck the accused in the face with a baton and pepper sprayed him while he was handcuffed.

 

The relevant facts were as follows:

Excessive Force

[18]            As indicated at the outset, Mr. Brannagan conceded that Brewer’s use of pepper spray was excessive force and a Charter violation. Mr. Chu also alleged that, in addition to pepper spray, excessive force was used in striking Mr. Hines in the face with a baton during the arrest. Those blows opened up two significant lacerations on the defendant’s face, which was made additionally painful by the application of pepper spray. The Crown refused to call Brewer, submitting that the defendant had the burden to prove facts that supported the Charter violation. While I agree the burden lies with the defendant to establish Charter violations, I ruled that fairness required this Court to call Brewer as a witness, allowing both counsel the opportunity to conduct cross-examinations. I did so because Brewer was, by nature of his actions that night, and by nature of his position as a police officer, a witness adverse to the defendant’s interest.

Constable Brewer

[19]            Brewer admitted striking Hines with his baton. He is unable to remember the number of strikes or the exact location of the strikes. Brewer was aware of facial injuries suffered by Hines but unaware if the cause was his baton strikes or when he was taken to the ground. He maintained he was frightened by the knife, and Hines assaultive behaviour, and not knowing if Hines still had a weapon. He also maintained the blows were done to effect an arrest, and not after Hines was handcuffed.

[20]            Constable Brewer’s status as a police officer is somewhat unusual. In September of 2017, he was convicted of Common Nuisance and Unauthorized Possession of a Firearm in Durham region arising from an incident that occurred on December 1, 2016. Constable Brewer had brought a handgun into the bedroom in which his spouse was sleeping, then followed her to the main floor holding the gun, put the gun in his own mouth, and then fired it eight times into the night sky outside his house. At the time, Brewer agreed he was suffering from depression, alcoholism and PTSD.

[21]            In addition to the criminal record resulting from the incident above, Brewer admitted drinking while on duty and being disciplined for it in November of 2016. Brewer denies alcohol was a factor in this case and does not think his mental health problems were either. Essentially he was of the view that Hines was “being actively resistant” and was attempting to get out of his scout car when he employed pepper spray.

[22]            While I found Constable Brewer’s evidence to be for the most part candid (and quite heartbreaking regarding his present condition), this last contention is demonstrably false. Mr. Hines was handcuffed to the rear and splayed out horizontally in the back seat of the scout car. Brewer stopped the scout car as it starts to leave the scene, and Brewer opened the door. Hines was not resisting; he was not kicking; and he certainly was not trying to escape.

[23]            In my view, to insist escape was the reason for employing pepper spray undermines what was otherwise credible evidence. That false contention makes his evidence, that he was unsure that his baton strikes connected with the defendant’s face, virtually impossible to accept.

At the Charter application, the Crown refused to call as a witness the police officer who struck and sprayed the accused, and so the court called the officer as a witness adverse in interest to the defence. The court declined to stay the charges (assault police, possession of a knife, possession of cocaine, and threatening), holding that a remedy could be fashioned on sentence.  The Court stated that:

[34]            A stay of proceedings is a drastic remedy, a remedy of last resort to be granted only in the clearest of cases (O’Connor 1995 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411). The defendant submits that no remedy short of a stay of proceedings is appropriate. Alternative remedies, sentence reduction for example, would not send the necessary message that the justice system denounces police brutality.

[35]            The defendant does not argue abuse of process in that the police conduct interfered with a fair trial. Rather, that it fell within the residual category referred to in paragraph 73 of O’Connor:

73               As I have already noted, the common law doctrine of abuse of process has found application in a variety of different circumstances involving state conduct touching upon the integrity of the judicial system and the fairness of the individual accused’s trial.  For this reason, I do not think that it is helpful to speak of there being any one particular “right against abuse of process” within the Charter.  Depending on the circumstances, different Charter guarantees may be engaged.  For instance, where the accused claims that the Crown’s conduct has prejudiced his ability to have a trial within a reasonable time, abuses may be best addressed by reference to s. 11(b) of the Charter, to which the jurisprudence of this Court has now established fairly clear guidelines (Morin, supra).  Alternatively, the circumstances may indicate an infringement of the accused’s right to a fair trial, embodied in ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.  In both of these situations, concern for the individual rights of the accused may be accompanied by concerns about the integrity of the judicial system.  In addition, there is a residual category of conduct caught by s. 7 of the Charter.  This residual category does not relate to conduct affecting the fairness of the trial or impairing other procedural rights enumerated in the Charter, but instead addresses the panoply of diverse and sometimes unforeseeable circumstances in which a prosecution is conducted in such a manner as to connote unfairness or vexatiousness of such a degree that it contravenes fundamental notions of justice and thus undermines the integrity of the judicial process.

[36]            When determining if a stay is the appropriate remedy for the “residual” category, the approach taken by the Supreme Court in R. v. Regan sets out the appropriate test to be considered. There are three factors to be considered by a court asked to order a stay of proceedings, as set out in Regan 2002 SCC 12 (CanLII), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, at paras. 54 – 57:

(1)     Will the prejudice caused by the impugned behaviour be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of a trial, or by its outcome;

(2)     Is any other remedy reasonably capable of removing the prejudice; and

(3)     If there should be doubt as to the appropriateness of a stay, how do the interests that would be served by a stay weigh against society’s interest in having a final decision on the charges on the merits?

[37]            Applying the above test, I conclude that there is a societal interest in having a judicial decision on the merits regarding the knife attack on Mr. Humphries. A remedy exists to reflect police brutality, which can be factored into the sentence. The assault police, possession of the knife, possession of cocaine, and uttering threats charges will be stayed as the only remedy capable of expressing this Court’s condemnation of Constable Brewer’s excessive use of force, as well as a recog­nition of the significant harm caused to Mr. Hines resulting from this brutality.

 

A different result was achieved in Reginav. Girbav, 2012 ABPC 219 wherein the Court, on similarly related facts, entered a stay of Proceedings by the Honourable Judge Brown of the Provincial Court of Alberta. In that decision, the Court, in directing the stay stated:

“While the beating meted out to Mr. Girbav was a far cry from the horrific assault in Tran, to allow the prosecution to continue, given the wantonness of the attack on Mr. Girbav and the attempt at burnishing the account after the fact, would cause irreparable harm to the justice system.  As in Mohmedi, Gladue and Tran, this appears to be a case in which the officers succumbed to anger in their dealings with Mr. Girbav.”
 

Cleary, this is a fact-driven inquiry that is mixed with complex issues of law and jurisprudence. It is critical to seek legal advice as soon as possible to ensure that the relevant evidence (including injuries) are well documented and evidence is preserved.

   

The above noted information is not intended as legal advice nor does it puport to provide information on any civil claims against a police force.  It is general information about specifically reported cases .  

 

Police Brutality, Excessive Force, Criminal Lawyers

If you have been charged with a offence that involved the use of excessive police force and/or abuse, call Mr. J.S. Patel, Criminal Defence Lawyer at 403-585-1960 for a consultation during regular office hours. 

     

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An evidentiary assessment, from the case-law, of the motives of complainants to lie in historical sexual assault cases, and a disbelief of accused’s evidence

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Motive to Fabricate

While the assessment of credibility in a context of a sexual assault is driven by general principles, there are deeper legal principles, surrounding the rules of evidence that govern its application.   In Regina v. A.S., 2017 ONCA 994, the Ontario Court of Appeal ordered a new trial for historical sexual offences allegedly committed by a pediatrician against two (2) of his former patients. The allegations spanned a period between 1964 and 2013. He was acquitted of charges against four (4) other complainants at trial. There is a publication ban on the nature of the facts.  The factual findings are related in the decision of the Court of Appeal.  This case is helpful in that is reinforces the Appellate Court’s views on the assessment of credibility when consider a motive to lie and the Crown’s failure to corroborate evidence in the context of historical sexual assault cases, where witness memories are typically spent.

Court of Appeal’s Decision in A.S.

The Court of Appeal found that the Trial Court’s misapprehensions of evidence and unsupported conclusions, taken together, meant the convictions could not stand. In summary, trial court had held that an absence of a complainant’s motive to lie enhanced her credibility. In citing Regina v. L. (L.)(2009), 96 O.R. (3d) 412 (C.A.), 2009 ONCA 413 (CanLII), at para. 44, the Court of Appeal held that “There are simply too many reasons why a person might not tell the truth, most of which will be unknown except to the person her/himself, to use it as a foundation to enhance the witness’ credibility” (at para. 25).  Of note, is the Court’s comments that certainly the absence of any apparent motive to lie is an unreliable marker of credibility.  Consequently, it is generally an unhelpful factor in assessing credibility  The trial court also erred by drawing an inference of guilt from her disbelief of the accused’s evidence and by attributing a motive to him, to visit the complainant, that was based on a misapprehension of the evidence. In addition, the trial court also rejected defence submissions about the importance of the absence of corroboration.  It stated: “None is required. Given the way the alleged crimes were committed where the only persons present were doctor and patient, the potential for corroboration does not arise.” The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge is correct that corroboration is not necessary in such cases, the trial court was not correct that the alleged crimes were committed where the only persons present were doctor and patient. On the complainant’s own version of events, a nurse walked in during the most serious of the assaults she described. There were other areas of potential corroboration as well, such as records confirming contact between the appellant and complainant. that never materialized. The trial court inaccurately dispensed with the potential for corroboration, presenting the risk that she may not have given sufficient consideration to the undeniable fact that the complainant’s allegations stood alone.
 

The above noted information is not intended as legal advice.  If you have been charged with a historical sexual assault offence, call Mr. J.S. Patel, Barrister at 403-585-1960 for a consultation.

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Removal or Withdrawal of Counsel from the Record for Ethical Reasons or Non-Payment of Fees, cases from 2018

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The Ontario Court of Appeal has recently ruled on the counsel’s ability to be withdrawn on counsel of record.  The starting point for any analysis stems from the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Regina v. Cunningham, [2010] 1 SCR 331, 2010 SCC 10 (CanLII) where the Court laid out the following principles to guide the Courts when it hears applications by accused persons and counsel to be withdrawn as counsel of record:  

[47] If counsel seeks to withdraw far enough in advance of any scheduled proceedings and an adjournment will not be necessary, then the court should allow the withdrawal.  In this situation, there is no need for the court to enquire into counsel’s reasons for seeking to withdraw or require counsel to continue to act.

 [48] Assuming that timing is an issue, the court is entitled to enquire further.  Counsel may reveal that he or she seeks to withdraw for ethical reasons, non-payment of fees, or another specific reason (e.g. workload of counsel) if solicitor-client privilege is not engaged.  Counsel seeking to withdraw for ethical reasons means that an issue has arisen in the solicitor-client relationship where it is now impossible for counsel to continue in good conscience to represent the accused.  Counsel may cite “ethical reasons” as the reason for withdrawal if, for example, the accused is requesting that counsel act in violation of his or her professional obligations (see, e.g., Law Society of Upper Canada, r. 2.09(7)(b), (d); Law Society of Alberta, c. 14, r. 2; Law Society of British Columbia, c. 10, r. 1), or if the accused refuses to accept counsel’s advice on an important trial issue (see, e.g., Law Society of Upper Canada, r. 2.09(2); Law Society of Alberta, c. 14, r. 1; Law Society of British Columbia, c. 10, r. 2).  If the real reason for withdrawal is non-payment of legal fees, then counsel cannot represent to the court that he or she seeks to withdraw for “ethical reasons”.  However, in either the case of ethical reasons or non-payment of fees, the court must accept counsel’s answer at face value and not enquire further so as to avoid trenching on potential issues of solicitor-client privilege.

[49] If withdrawal is sought for an ethical reason, then the court must grant withdrawal (see C. (D.D.), at p. 328, and Deschamps, at para. 23).  Where an ethical issue has arisen in the relationship, counsel may be required to withdraw in order to comply with his or her professional obligations.  It would be inappropriate for a court to require counsel to continue to act when to do so would put him or her in violation of professional responsibilities.

 [50] If withdrawal is sought because of  non-payment of legal fees,  the court may exercise its discretion to refuse counsel’s request.  The court’s order refusing counsel’s request to withdraw may be enforced by the court’s contempt power (C. (D.D.), at p. 327).  In exercising its discretion on the withdrawal request, the court should consider the following non-exhaustive list of factors:

   
  1. whether it is feasible for the accused to represent himself or herself;
  2. other means of obtaining representation;
  3. impact on the accused from delay in proceedings, particularly if the accused is in custody;
  4. conduct of counsel, e.g. if counsel gave reasonable notice to the accused to allow the accused to seek other means of representation, or if counsel sought leave of the court to withdraw at the earliest possible time;
  5. impact on the Crown and any co‑accused;
  6. impact on complainants, witnesses and jurors;
  7. fairness to defence counsel, including consideration of the expected length and complexity of the proceedings;
  8. the history of the proceedings, e.g. if the accused has changed lawyers repeatedly.
  As these factors are all independent of the solicitor-client relationship, there is no risk of violating solicitor-client privilege when engaging in this analysis.  On the basis of these factors, the court must determine whether allowing withdrawal would cause serious harm to the administration of justice.  If the answer is yes, withdrawal may be refused.
In Regina v. Short, 2018 ONCA 1, the Ontario Court of Appeal ordered a new trial for first degree murder where the trial judge refused to let defence counsel off the record six (6) prior to the commencement of the trial proper.   Defence counsel made representations to the presiding judge that indicating that there was a “loss of confidence” between the accused person and himself.  That loss of confidence was such that counsel could not discharge his duties under the Law Society Rules because he could not ethically proceed.  The second ground cited by the defence lawyer was that he was not being paid by the client.  Finally, the defence counsel argued that “Counsel took immediate steps following such a loss of confidence in the relationship to prepare and file the Notice of Application.”  Trial counsel made representations to the trial judge in which he briefly outlined the history of his relationship with the appellant; again, he indicated he had not been paid and referred to the possibility of a lawsuit for payment of the funds owed to him. Counsel also advised the trial judge that because of the non-payment, he had been unable to do things that should have been done in preparation for the second trial.     The trial court considered these explanations but further queried defence counsel on the merits of the representations made and the materials filed, which perciepirated the following response by the Defence Lawyer:    

…I am telling Your Honour that there are issues that have arisen that result in a loss of confidence between Mr. Short and I…

…[A]nd I can tell you as an officer of the court, this is not me putting on top of a non-payment of fees, a paragraph that says there’s a loss of confidence just to get an easy way out. This is probably the most difficult decision I have done. In this particular case I have, without disclosing anything, done everything I can to move this case forward. After the second trial I wiped much of my calendar clean to get this second trial as quick as possible. Obviously, there were communications between my client and I that allowed me to make the decision to go forward, financially and for another, another, another, abound of reasons. But I am telling the [sic] today, is that having no funds, and not being able to disclose to you the communications between the client and I, that I cannot represent Mr. Short going forward. [Emphasis added.]

    It is also critical to note that the trial Court did not query the accused person because it was concerned about the possibility that confidential information would be related to the Court that would not have otherwise be the case if the application had not been made. The Crown Prosecutor objected to the application made by defence counsel.  Oddly, the Crown advised the Court that only payment issues were cited to the preclusion of ethical issues, suggesting that the defence counsel was camouflaging the true nature and merits of the application.  In accepting the Crown’s argument and rejecting defence counsel’s application to be removed as counsel of record, it stated:   Given the weight and tenor of the balance of the affidavit dwelling on financial issues, I am forced to conclude that the reference to ethics in the adverb “ethically” has no basis in evidence. I am persuaded that [trial counsel’s] difficulties relate to payment of his accounts and not to an ethical dilemma.[Emphasis added.]  
The Court of Appeal in Ontario held the trial judge was obligated to accept the defence counsel’s representations (as stated above) that the solicitor-client relationship had broken down; and should have accepted his application to be removed as counsel of record.  The failure to do so culminated in an error that rendered the trial unfair and created a miscarriage of justice. What is more, the trial court also erred by failing to hear from the accused as to whether he wanted to continue with the lawyer.
If you require the assistance of a defence lawyer, call J.S. Patel at 403-585-1960. However, please note that it is not our practice to discuss matters with potential clients when you currently have a lawyer.    

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The Constitutionality of the Dangerous Offender Provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada.

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Under the Criminal Code of Canada (the “Code”), a “dangerous offender” designation carries serious criminal law consequences.  Generally, it is reserved for the most violent and sexual predators.  The designation carries an automatic sentence of imprisonment for an indeterminate period, with no chance of parole for seven years.   The constitutionality of those provisions of the Code were recently challenged in the Supreme Court of Canada in a case called R. v. Boutilier, 2017 SCC 64 (“Boutilier”).   The majority of the Court upheld the constitutionality of the two (2) sections of the regime that was amended in 2008.  Currently, Section 753(1) of the Code sets out this two-stage test: the designation stage and the penalty stage.  It requires the lower Court, tasked with the adjudication, at the designation stage, if a sentencing judge is satisfied that the statutory criteria under s. 753(1) have been met, the designation as a dangerous offender must follow. At the penalty stage, under s. 753(4.1), a sentencing judge must impose an indeterminate sentence on a designated individual (an ordinary sentence followed by a long-term supervision order, or only an ordinary sentence) unless he or she is satisfied that there is a reasonable expectation that a lesser measure will adequately protect the public.   In this case, the sentencing judge granted B’s application in part, finding only that s. 753(1) is unconstitutionally overbroad. Nevertheless, the sentencing judge held that B was a dangerous offender and sentenced him to an indeterminate detention. The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge had erred in finding s. 753(1) to be overbroad but agreed with the sentencing judge that s. 753(4.1) did not violate ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal dismissed B’s appeal of his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.  The matter was further appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court stated the following in relevant part:   Continue reading The Constitutionality of the Dangerous Offender Provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada. →

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Whether text messages attract a reasonable expectation of privacy under Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and whether such evidence ought to be ought excluded from a trial viz Section 24(2) of the Charter?

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Whether text messages attract a reasonable expectation of privacy under Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and whether such evidence ought to be ought excluded from a trial viz Section 24(2) of the Charter?

Text messages that have been sent and received can, in some cases, attract a reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore can be protected under s.8 of the Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada (the “SCC”) in Regina v. Marakah, 2017 SCC 59 framed the (Orwellian) issues in this way:

Can Canadians ever reasonably expect the text messages they send to remain private, even after the messages have reached their destination? Or is the state free, regardless of the circumstances, to access text messages from a recipient’s device without a warrant? The question in this appeal is whether the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure in s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms can ever apply to such messages.

In a five (5): two (2) split, the SCC allowed the accused’s appeal, set aside his convictions for multiple firearms offences, and entered acquittals. The accused sent text messages dialoguing illegal transactions in firearms. The police obtained warrants to search the accused’s home and that of W. They seized the accused’s BlackBerry and W’s iPhone, searched the devices, and found incriminating text messages. It was argued at trial, by his criminal defence counsel, that the indexed messages ought not be admitted against him based on a breach of his s.8 Charter right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure. Based on the arguments and submissions made to an application judge, it was held that the warrant for the accused’s home was invalid; and that the text messages recovered from his BlackBerry could not be used against him, but that the accused had no standing to argue that the messages recovered from W’s iPhone should not be admitted against him.  The phone did not belong to him, and as such, did not retain a privacy interest in the item.  As a logical consequence of that decision, the application judge admitted the text messages and convicted the accused. A majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the accused’s appeal.

On further appeal, the majority of the SCC held in Marakah that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages recovered from W’s iPhone, and therefore had standing to claim s.8 Charter protection for the text messages.

The majority reasoned that: the subject matter of the alleged search was the electronic conversation between the accused and W; the accused had a direct interest in the subject matter; the accused subjectively expected it to remain private; and that expectation was objectively reasonable. The majority stated that the risk that W could have disclosed the text messages to third parties did not negate the reasonableness of the accused’s expectation of privacy against state intrusion. The majority also stated that its conclusion on the issue of standing was not displaced by policy concerns.

The Crown conceded that if the accused had standing, the search was unreasonable. The text messages were thus presumptively inadmissible against the accused, subject to s.24(2) of the Charter. The majority held that the evidence should be excluded under s.24(2). The majority stated that society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits favoured admission. However, the police conduct in accessing and searching the electronic conversation through W’s iPhone without a warrant two hours after his arrest was sufficiently serious to warrant exclusion. In addition, the police conduct had a considerable impact on the accused’s Charter-protected privacy interest in the electronic conversation. The majority concluded that, on balance, the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Two (2) members of the Court dissented. Justices Moldaver and Côté JJ. would have held that the accused did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text message conversations with W and therefore, he lacked standing to challenge the search of W’s phone under s.8 of the Charter. The dissenting minority stated that the accused’s lack of control over W’s phone was fatal to his reasonable expectation of privacy in the text message conversations on W’s phone, and that policy considerations supported the conclusion that the accused lacked standing under s.8.

If you have been charged with a criminal offence wherein the police have secured your mobile devices in the similar matter, contact an experienced criminal lawyer from our office.  Call J.S. Patel, Barrister at 403-585-1960 or 1-888-695-2211 for a consultation.  

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The conduct of the defence in assessing the delay at trial under Section 11(b) of the Charter; and whether the calculation of the delay is the period between charge and verdict or between charge and sentence.

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August 20, 2017

The conduct of the defence in assessing the delay at trial under Section 11(b) of the Charter; and whether the calculation of the delay is the period between charge and verdict or between charge and sentence.  By J.S. Patel, Barrister, 403-585-1960 or 1-888-695-2211

In our previous Blog on R. v. Jordan, and R. v. Cody, we outlined the general legal test that the Courts use to determine whether a delay is considered unreasonable and to stay all charges against an accused person.  Two (2) presumptive ceilings were set: (a) eighteen (18) months of delay in matters in the Provincial Court; and (b) thirty (30) months for charges in the Superior Courts in Canada.  The issue of defence delay was expounded upon more recently in Regina v. Cody 2017 SCC 31; and it is described in our blow summarizing the judgement.  The conduct of the defence and Counsel is a relevant factor in determining whether there was an unreasonable delay that would attract a stay of proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Charter.

For instance, in Regina v. Mallozzi, 2017 ONCA 644, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the Trial Court’s Assessment of the alleged defence delay, in dismissing the accused’s application for a stay of proceedings on the basis of unreasonable delay under s.11(b) of the Charter.  In that case, the accused was convicted of two (2) counts of producing marijuana.  There was a preliminary inquiry;  and two (2) mistrials, which spanned over five (5)  years from the date he was charged. The court held that the “net-delay” was under the thirty (30) month ceiling created by  Jordan; and importantly, that the defence waived or caused thirty-seven (37) of the total sixty (60) months of delay. What is more, many dates had been offered to try to accommodate the schedule of defence counsel while the Crown and court were able to proceed earlier, and there was an express waiver of a further period.

In the obiter dictum of the judgement, the Ontario Court of Appeal further opined that even if the total ‘net-delay’ had surpassed the thirty (30) month ceiling as posited in R. v. Jordan (SCC), the resulting delay would have been justifiable given the two (2) mistrials, which the Court would have found fell within the rubric of term: ‘exceptional delay.’  This is because, in the Court’s view, the first (1st) mistrial came to fruition as a result of a defence objection concerning the empanelment of the 12th juror under Section 642 of the Criminal Code of Canada (the “Code”).   Defence counsel’s assertion that this delay was due to the summoning of too few potential jurors was rejected.  The Court of Appeal found that the defence position on this issue had been “frivolous.”  What is more, the second mistrial was agreed to by the Crown and the defence on the basis that the five of the jurors on the current panel had been on the previous panel. The Court took the view that the this second mistrial had been unnecessary; and that these particular events were unforeseeable.  Thus, they were not a “failure of the system” as advocated by the accused person at appeal.  Finally, the Court of Appeal also stated the transitional provision applied to the delay, which was incurred prior to the decision in Jordan, above.

What is interesting, however, is that the Ontario Court of Appeal, explicitly declined to decide whether the period of delay for s.11(b) purposes is the period between charge and verdict or between charge and sentence. Accordingly, this issue remains arguably open for consideration should the issue arise against in the future.

The issues involved in Charter applications under Section 11(b) involve complicated considerations and a thorough assessment of the applicable legal principles.  While it is clearly impossible to predict the outcome of proceedings and manner in which trials will unfold, the Mallozzi case clearly demonstrates the importance of considering the manner of defence delay and the strategic steps that need to be taken at trial. Experienced lawyers ought to be consulted in making such an application.

Contact our offices at 403-585-1960 or 1-888-695-2211 for an initial consultation.

*** The opinions expressed in this Blog are not a substitute for full and through legal advice. It is not meant to be used as fulsome account of area of law discussed.  It is your responsibility to obtained a full legal opinion concerning your matter.  

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Sentencing – Immigration consequences not considered

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Sentenced overturned from twelve months of jail to six months less a day to avoid severe immigration consequences. 

The collateral immigration consequences should be considered in a sentencing hearing for a criminal matter.   Since this case involves an on-going publication ban, the names of the parties involved (inclusive of the witnesses) will be stated in this post.  The case will be referred to as Regina v. A.I., 2017 ONCA 597 (RD).For another Blog post that describes a case dealing with counsel’s obligations, under the common-law, to be aware of the immigration consequences, please consult the post of June 13, 2017 titled:  Criminal defence lawyers must be aware of the immigration consequences at a sentencing on any guilty pleas under the Criminal Code of Canada that may result in a removal order being issued against a client.

An appeal was allowed against a sentence that was imposed on an accused person who had plead guilty to arson; and received a jail term of twelve months and three (3) years of probation.   The indexed property damage was minimal.  During the sentencing hearing, the offender, was not aware of the collateral immigration consequences as he was not aware that he was no a Canadian Citizen.  Thus, no one, including the Court was aware of the offenders standing under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (the “IRPA”).  An offender in similar circumstances will likely be issued a removal order by the Immigration Division due to his inadmissibility to Canada under Section 36 of the IRPA, which addresses the term “serious criminality” for permanent residents in these prescribed terms:

“(a) having been convicted in Canada of an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years, or of an offence under an Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of more than six months has been imposed”

The question then becomes whether Arson, under the Criminal Code of Canada, carries a maximum term of imprisonment of at least ten (10) years. The penalty for Arson under certain sections of the Code can be fourteen (14) years.

Accordingly, this offender could be caught by the Immigration Section that will likely result in a removal order against them.  The consideration that follows is whether a person, in similar circumstances, can appeal a removal order to the Immigration Appeal Division (the “IAD”), and raise equitable and humanitarian consideration, in order to remain in Canada, albeit conditionally.  What adds to this difficulty for this particular offender, is that theIRPA denies access to an appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division against any removal orders (deportation orders) when an offender has served six (6) or more months of jail. This is effectively a bright line test that ousts the jurisdiction of the Immigration Appeal Division to hear such appeals; and a sentence of twelve (12) months ought remove the jurisdiction of the IAD to hear an appeal against a removal order.  Parenthetically, the only remedy that remains is an application to persuade the Canada Border Service Agency to not issue a report that starts that process of a removal order (which is beyond the scope of this post and a complicated legal assessment that must be rendered on a case by case basis.

The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed this offender’s appeal against his effective sentence of 12 months plus three (3) years’ probation for arson. While the OCA does not cite any of the above, such legal considerations are live realities that this offender faced. Removal was likely to occur, by operation of law, with little to no legal remedy available to this offender. Ultimately, the OCA found that the sentence was unfit. Such a sentence would lead to youthful accused with special needs deported to a refugee camp in a country where he had no connection and no supports. The court reduced the accused’s sentence to six months less a day.

*** The opinions expressed in this Blog are not a substitute for full and through legal advice. It is not meant to be used a fulsome account of entire decision and area of law discussed. 

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The Supreme Court of Canada clarifies and confirms the “Ladder Approach” to release on bail pending a trial.

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Bail Hearings and the Reinforcement of the “Ladder Approach” and the “ability to pay”: by J.S. Patel, Criminal Lawyer – Bail Hearings: 403-585-1960 The Supreme Court of Canada recently address the constitutional of Section 512(2)(e) of the Criminal Code of Canada in the context of Judicial Interim Release (bail hearings) in Regina v. Antic 2017 SCC 27/. Parenthetically, he was not represented by a Criminal Defence lawyer at his appeal before the Supreme Court. Mr. Antic lost this appeal.  The critical issue before the appeal was whether Section 512(2)(e) permits a justice of the peace or a judge, without the submissions of a criminal defence lawyer, to require  require both a cash deposit and surety supervision only if the accused is from out of the province or does not ordinarily reside within 200 km of the place in which he or she is in custody.   Mr. Antic was an Ontario resident that ordinarily resided outside of the two-hundred (200) geographic limiter relative to the place of the indexed offence.  On an application by a criminal defence lawyer  in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice for a bail review, the presiding Justice found that since the geographical limitation in s. 515(2) (e) prevented the Superior Court from granting bail on the terms that it deemed appropriate, the provision violated the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause under s. 11 (e) of the Charter . Accordingly, the Court severed and struck down the geographical limitation in s. 515(2) (e) and ordered A’s release with a surety and a cash deposit of $100,000. The Public Prosecution Service of Canada (the “Crown”) sought to appeal the decision from the Superior Court to the Court of Appeal; and then ultimately to the Supreme Court of Canada.  The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provision was not unconstitutional, as found by the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario, and allowed the Crown appeal and reversed the declaration of unconstitutionality.  The real importance of this decision sits with the SCC’s reinforcement of the proper bail principles and the manner in that they were currently being inconsistently applied through out the domain of Canada.  The SCC went through all of the applicable bail principles that may be “traced back to English antiquity”, to assist the Courts, Criminal Bail Lawyer, and Crown prosecutors with succinct bail principles under the well know “Ladder Approach” – it is codified under Section 515(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada: [46]                          Aside from the release of an accused under s. 515(1) on his or her giving an undertaking without conditions, s. 515(2) sets out the other permissible forms of pre-trial release: (2) Where the justice does not make an order under subsection (1), he shall, unless the prosecutor shows cause why the detention of the accused is justified, order that the accused be released (a) on his giving an undertaking with such conditions as the justice directs; (b) on his entering into a recognizance before the justice, without sureties, in such amount and with such conditions, if any, as the justice directs but without deposit of money or other valuable security; (c) on his entering into a recognizance before the justice with sureties in such amount and with such conditions, if any, as the justice directs but without deposit of money or other valuable security; (d) with the consent of the prosecutor, on his entering into a recognizance before the justice, without sureties, in such amount and with such conditions, if any, as the justice directs and on his depositing with the justice such sum of money or other valuable security as the justice directs; or (e) if the accused is not ordinarily resident in the province in which the accused is in custody or does not ordinarily reside within two hundred kilometres of the place in which he is in custody, on his entering into a recognizance before the justice with or without sureties in such amount and with such conditions, if any, as the justice directs, and on his depositing with the justice such sum of money or other valuable security as the justice directs. As stated by the Court, each provision, moving from s. 515(2)(a) to s. 515(2)(e), involves more burdensome conditions of release for the accused than the one before it. These forms of release, coupled with the specific release terms a justice or a judge may impose under s. 515(4) , have significant potential to impinge on an accused person’s liberty. The theoretical underpinnings of s. 515(2) of the Code avers that the Section 11(e) Charter right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause is an integral part of an enlightened justice system; it fortifies the concept central to the presumption of innocence especially at the pre-trial stage shortly after the panic stricken stage of an arrest by the Toronto or Calgary Police Services.   The right is bifurcated in two (2) prongs:  (i) anyone charged with an offence, bears the right not to be denied bail without just cause (as stated above); and (ii) NOT to be denied reasonable bail. Under the first prong, “circumstances, and the denial is necessary to promote the proper functioning of the bail system and is not undertaken for any purpose extraneous to that system”.   While under the second prong of the right, “…the right to reasonable bail, relates to the terms of bail, including the quantum of any monetary component and other restrictions that are imposed on the accused for the release period. It protects accused persons from conditions and forms of release that are unreasonable.” The SCC stated the strongly emphasized the following in regards to the second prong of the right to reasonable bail: “While a bail hearing is an expedited procedure, the bail provisions are federal law and must be applied consistently and fairly in all provinces and territories. A central part of the Canadian law of bail consists of the ladder principle and the authorized forms of release, which are found in s. 515(1)  to (3) of the Criminal Code . Save for exceptions, an unconditional release on an undertaking is the default position when granting release. Alternative forms of release are to be imposed in accordance with the ladder principle, which must be adhered to strictly: release is favoured at the earliest reasonable opportunity and on the least onerous grounds. If the Crown proposes an alternate form of release, it must show why this form is necessary for a more restrictive form of release to be imposed. Each rung of the ladder must be considered individually and must be rejected before moving to a more restrictive form of release. Where the parties disagree on the form of release, it is an error of law for a judge to order a more restrictive form without justifying the decision to reject the less onerous forms. A recognizance with sureties is one of the most onerous forms of release, and should not be imposed unless all the less onerous forms have been considered and rejected as inappropriate. It is not necessary to impose cash bail on accused persons if they or their sureties have reasonably recoverable assets and are able to pledge those assets to the satisfaction of the court. A recognizance is functionally equivalent to cash bail and has the same coercive effect. Cash bail should be relied on only in exceptional circumstances in which release on a recognizance with sureties is unavailable. When cash bail is ordered, the amount must not be set so high that it effectively amounts to a detention order, which means that the amount should be no higher than necessary to satisfy the concern that would otherwise warrant detention and proportionate to the means of the accused and the circumstances of the case. The judge is under a positive obligation to inquire into the ability of the accused to pay. Terms of release under s. 515(4)  should only be imposed to the extent that they are necessary to address concerns related to the statutory criteria for detention and to ensure that the accused is released. They must not be imposed to change an accused person’s behaviour or to punish an accused person. Where a bail review is requested, courts must follow the bail review process set out in R. v. St‑Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 328.” In Mr. Antic’s criminal bail appeal, the Court found that  s. 515(2) (e) of the Criminal Code  did not have the effect of denying him bail but rather it was the Superior Court bail review judge’s application of the bail provisions that did so. The Superior Court  judge committed two (2) errors in delineating the release order: (i) First, by requiring a cash deposit with a surety, one of the most onerous forms of release, he failed to adhere to the ladder principle. Even though Mr. Antic had offered a surety with a monetary pledge, the bail review judge was fixated on and insisted on a cash deposit because he believed the erroneous assumption that cash is more coercive than a pledge; and (ii) Second, the bail review judge erred in making his decision on the basis of speculation as to whether Mr. Antic might believe that forfeiture proceedings would not be taken against his elderly grandmother if he breached his bail terms. A judge cannot impose a more onerous form of release solely because he or she speculates that the accused will not believe in the enforceability of a surety or a pledge. Parliament expressly authorized the possibility of an accused being released on entering into a recognizance with sureties in the place of cash bail, and judges should not undermine the bail scheme by speculating, contrary to any evidence and to Parliament’s intent, that requiring cash will be more effective.  As a result the Court found at para 49 as follows, in relevant part: [49]                          Therefore, where a monetary condition of release is necessary and a satisfactory personal recognizance or recognizance with sureties can be obtained, a justice or a judge cannot impose cash bail. A pledge and a deposit perform the same function: the accused or the surety may lose his or her money if the accused person breaches the terms of bail. Release with a pledge of money thus has the same coercive power as release with a cash deposit. If charged with a criminal or immigration offence, it is critical to contact a competent Defence lawyer that is away of the panoply of rights available to you.  Call: 403-585-1960 to speak to a lawyer or leave a confidential voice mail  for a free consultation