Dangerous Driving under the Criminal Code of Canada
In Regina v. Raj, 2018 ONCA 623 (CanLII) the Ontario Court of Appeal dealt with the conviction appeal for an accused person involving a commercial dump-truck operator. It was a case Dangerous Driving involving alcohol and the use of a Commercial Vehicle. The facts underpinning the appeal involved a proven allegation that the accused had driven the raised box of his dump truck into an over-pass. The accused was/is a professional truck driver. On July 31, 2014, he was driving a commercial dump truck on the Queen Elizabeth Highway (“QEW”). There was a trailer attached to the truck whose box could be raised and lowered using a system of buttons and levers in the truck called the Power Take-off (“PTO”) system. That day, the appellant had left the PTO lever in the ‘On’ position. Under certain circumstances, leaving the PTO engaged permitted the trailer to rise.
The accident scene was chaotic and dangerous, and the police placed the accused in a police car for 2.5 hours for his own safety. The following arguments were raised by the accused’s criminal appeal lawyers: First, it was posited that the trial judge erred by concluding that the appellant’s confinement in the police cruiser for 2.5 hours was not an arbitrary detention contrary to s. 9 of the CanadianCharter of Rights and Freedoms. Second, if that argument was successful, then it was argued that result would be that the police breached both his s. 9 and s. 10 Charter rights. This, it was argued, would call for a reappraisal of the trial judge’s s. 24(2) analysis and lead to a different result – the exclusion of the evidence relating to the smell of alcohol on the appellant’s breath. The Court disagreed. It said that the principal, and continuing, purpose of the appellant’s detention was his own safety. His truck had caused a terrible accident with extensive damage to vehicles and a bridge and injuries to several people. The police noticed the appellant walking around a dangerous accident scene and sitting on a guardrail very close to a damaged and collapsing girder. Importantly, his truck was crushed.
The Ontario Court of Appeal also upheld the decision of the trial judge admitting evidence of a smell of alcohol on the accused’s breath even though the police did not provide access to counsel during the detention, breaching s.10(b) of the Charter. The police conduct was only a mistake and not deliberate misconduct, and the police would have smelled the alcohol even if they had acted properly.
What is more, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s finding that the accused’s conduct was a marked departure from a reasonable person’s driving. This was mostly due, in large part on the accused’s alcohol consumption, and his failure over forty (40) seconds to notice that the box of his dump truck had raised. The court said that prior to colliding with the bridge superstructure the appellant drove a one (1) kilometer distance for forty (40) seconds without detecting the rising dump box despite its effect on the truck’s handling and despite it being clearly visible from all of the truck’s mirrors.Given all the factors, the Court of Appeal dismissed the possibility of the that period of time constituting an “momentary inadvertence.”
Informer Privilege, Innocence at Stake, Police Obligations
Pre-trial disclosure applications to secure information from confidential informants has been heavily considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in previous cases (i.e. Regina v. Barros, 2011 SCC 51). This case, however, involves an academically interesting question of criminal law. It was eloquently framed in the following manner by the Supreme Court of Canada today in the Reginav. Brassington, 2018 SCC 37, decision that was released by the Court:
When police officers are charged with crimes relating to their conduct during an investigation, can they, at their own discretion, disclose to their defence lawyers information they learned during that investigation that might reveal the identity of a confidential informer?
In very general terms, the the police informer privilege is the common law rule of evidence to the effect that a Crown witness suspected of being, or known to be, a police informer cannot be questioned as to whether or not he is one. Nor can another witness be asked questions which would disclose the identity of a police informer : A.-G. v. Briant(1846), 15 M.&W. 169, 153 E.R. 808, 15 L.J. Ex. 265, cited in Reginav. Blain (1960), 33 C.R. 217 at 219, 127 C.C.C. 267 (Sask.C.A.), also cited in Solicitor-General of Canadav. Royal Commission Re Health Records(1981), 62 C.C.C. (2d) 193 at 219, 23 C.R.(3d) 338 (S.C.C.).
In this case, four (4) police officers were charged with crimes relating to alleged misconduct during a police investigation. This criminal matter arose from the “Surrey Six” investigation, a complex RCMP investigation into a gang-related homicide. According to the Crown, about eighty (80) confidential informers were involved in the investigation.
Prior to their trial, those police officer-defendants applied for a declaration that they could discuss information they learned during the investigation with their defence counsel that might reveal the identity of confidential informers. The assigned case management judge granted the application, declaring that the officers could discuss any information in their possession with counsel. The Crown and the RCMP then brought proceedings to determine whether the communications authorized under the declaratory order constituted “disclosures” within the meaning of s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act . Pursuant to s. 37(1) of the Act, the Crown may object to disclosures on public interest grounds. Section 37.1 of the Act provides a special right of appeal from a determination of an objection. Sections 37 and 37.1 apply to criminal proceedings and other matters over which Parliament has jurisdiction. The case management judge found that she had jurisdiction to hear the Crown’s objection but dismissed it. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the rejection of the s. 37 objection. It characterized the order allowing disclosure as civil rather than criminal in nature, held that an appeal under s. 37.1 was unavailable and held that the Crown could not object to the declaratory order under s. 37 . The case management judge’s declaratory order and the Court of Appeal’s decision were appealed to the Court.
The Supreme Court of Canada granted the Crown and order that the declaratory order should be set aside. An order should be granted pursuant to s. 37(6) of the Canada Evidence Act prohibiting the officers from disclosing informer‑privileged information to their counsel, subject to a successful innocence at stake application. The SCC ruled that the case management judge had jurisdiction to hear the Crown’s objection to the declaratory order under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act and an appeal to the Court of Appeal under s. 37.1 was therefore proper. The declaratory order was criminal in nature and therefore within Parliament’s constitutional authority. In determining whether an order is civil or criminal in nature, what is relevant is not the formal title or styling of the order, but its substance and purpose. Here, the order related to the accused’s claim that declaratory relief was necessary to help them make full answer and defence in ongoing criminal proceedings, and it was issued by a criminal case management judge in connection with the rights of the parties in a pending criminal proceeding, regarding what might be done by the accused in conducting their defence. The fact that it was declaratory does not change its essential character.
Furthermore, s. 37 was the proper route for challenging the order, as it authorized a form of disclosure to which the Crown was entitled to object on public interest grounds. The interconnected purposes of ss. 37 and 37.1 are to give the Crown the ability to object to disclosures on public interest grounds, and to grant an interlocutory right of appeal where it is unsuccessful. They provide a valuable tool for the Crown to protect against disclosure of confidential and privileged information, and reflect the fact that the Crown’s ability to object to disclosures on public interest grounds was not meant to be restricted to those circumstances where the disclosure is compulsory and will occur in open court. Disclosures may be equally harmful to the public interest whether they are made in or outside of court, and whether they are made under compulsion or voluntarily.
The Supreme Court of Canada ruled in this case that the officers are not entitled to disclose the informer‑privileged information to their lawyers. This is because the current jurisprudence prevents piercing informer privilege unless the accused can show that his or her innocence is at stake. As such, there is no basis for departing from that rule when the accused is a police officer. Informer privilege arises in circumstances where police receive information under a promise of confidentiality. Informers are entitled to rely on that promise. What is more, the informer privilege rule is a common law rule of long standing and it is fundamentally important to the criminal justice system. Subject to the innocence at stake exception, the privilege acts as a complete bar on the disclosure of the informer’s identity, and the police, the Crown and the courts are bound to uphold it. In order to pierce informer privilege — the innocence at stake test — is, accordingly, onerous; and that privilege should be infringed only where core issues going to the guilt of the accused are involved and there is a genuine risk of a wrongful conviction. In this case, the defence counsel or their the officers (defedants) in this case did not argue that any privileged information in their possession meets the innocence at stake test. Nor did they suggest any information relating to confidential informers was genuinely relevant to their defence.
Furthermore, as previously confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada, defence counsel are outside the circle of informer privilege, that is, the group of people who are entitled to access information covered by informer privilege. In all cases where informer privilege applies, disclosure outside the circle requires a showing of innocence at stake. Limitations placed on what the police officers can say to their lawyers do not create conflicting legal and professional duties; rather, they align with the officers’ professional duties and allow their lawyers to proceed without fear of inadvertently revealing the privileged information their clients possess. The law may require officers to exercise some degree of caution with respect to what they disclose, but that expectation does not meaningfully interfere with their relationship with counsel. The primary purpose of the right to free solicitor‑client communication in a criminal proceeding is to permit the accused and counsel to discuss issues that go to full answer and defence — “solicitor‑client communication” does not have some independent, intrinsic value over and above its relationship to full answer and defence. Like any other criminal defendant, if it becomes clear that the police officers are at genuine risk of conviction, and that this information needs to be disclosed, they can bring a Regina. v.McClure, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445 . application. The application in this case was not brought under the ordinary McClure process, nor was it adjudicated under McClureprinciples. Instead, the accused sought a pre-trial remedy of declaratory relief, relating not to the scope of privilege, but rather to who is entitled to access information that everyone agrees is within the scope. In such cases, Access to the information will be given only where an accused demonstrates “innocence at stake”,as explained later in these reasons.
Police officers are, when accused of crimes, entitled to expect that they will be treated no less fairly than others who are accused and given the full protection of the law. What they are not entitled to expect is that they will be treated better. There is no reason to advantage police officers who, by virtue of their positions of trust, have information that has been confided to them for safekeeping. It is not their information to exploit for personal juridical gain.
Mr. J.S. Patel is a criminal defence lawyer that assumes conduct of all criminal trial and appeal matters. If you have been charged with a criminal offence, please feel free to call 403-585-1960 for a free initial consultation.
Refusal to Provide a Breath Sample. Call Mr. J. S. Patel, Criminal Lawyer at 403-585-1960 for a consultation.
In Regina v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, a 6:1 majority of the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the accused’s appeal in part. The Court set aside his 26-month sentence of imprisonment, imposed by the lower sentencing court, for the offence of refusing to provide a breath sample knowing that he caused an accident resulting in a death (Criminal Code, s.255(3.2)),and imposed a sentence of time served of just over ten (10) and a (1/2) half months.
That said, the circumstances of this case are unique as related recently on CBC news. The fatal accident was caused by a non-impaired driving error, and Mr. Suter refused to provide the police with a breath sample because he received bad legal advice. The lawyer he called from the police station expressly told him not to provide a breath sample, and Mr. Suter demurred. Added to this, sometime after the accident, Mr. Suter was attacked by a group of vigilantes who used a set of pruning shears to cut off his thumb. His wife was also attacked in a separate incident. He later pleaded guilty to the s.255(3.2) offence and the other charges were withdrawn.
The sentencing judge imposed a sentence of four (4) months’ imprisonment plus a thirty (30) month driving prohibition. The Judge found that the accident was caused by a non-impaired driving error. He also found that the accused’s refusal to provide a breath sample was the result of bad legal advice and was a mistake of law, which fundamentally changed the accused’s moral culpability. In addition, he noted several other mitigating factors, and also took into account the violent vigilante actions against the accused. However, the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal disagreed with this sentence. The Appeal court increased the custodial portion of the sentence to twenty-six (26) months. The court found that: the deficient legal advice did not constitute a mistake of law and it could not be used to mitigate the accused’s sentence; the sentencing judge failed to consider, as an aggravating factor, that the accused chose to drive while distracted in the context of his health and pre-existing alcohol problems; and the sentencing judge erred by taking the vigilante violence into account.
The majority of the Supreme Court held that both the sentencing judge and the Court of Appeal committed errors in principle that resulted in the imposition of unfit sentences. The majority held as follows:
The Court of Appeal erred by effectively sentencing the accused for the uncharged offence of careless driving or dangerous driving causing death. A further error was committed by the Court of Appeal in failing to consider the vigilante violence suffered by the accused. The majority stated that vigilante violence against an offender for his or her role in the commission of an offence is a collateral consequence that should be considered — to a limited extent — when crafting an appropriate sentence.
What is more, the sentencing judge erred in finding that the accused was acting under a mistake of law when he refused to provide the police with a breath sample and that this factor fundamentally changed the accused’s moral culpability. He also erred in giving undue weight to the accused’s non-impairment as a mitigating factor.
Taking into account the attenuating factors in the case, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that a sentence of 15 to 18 months’ imprisonment would have been a fit sentence at the time of sentencing. The majority held, however, that in the circumstances of this case – the accused had already served just over 10 and a half months of his custodial sentence and had spent almost nine months waiting for the court’s decision – it would not be in the interests of justice to re-incarcerate the accused.
The final dissenting opinion came from Justice Gascon. His decision was predicated on principles of deference towards the sentencing judge. Justice Gascon would have set aside the 26-month sentence of imprisonment imposed by the Court of Appeal and restored the four-month sentence imposed by the sentencing judge. Gascon J. held that there was no legal basis to justify appellate intervention with the initial sentence in the case.
Assault Assault Trials, Criminal Defence Lawyers for Sexual Assault Charges.
Evidence of sexual activity between a complainant and another person may be admitted if it is not tendered for a purpose prohibited by s.276(1) of the Criminal Code and it satisfies the admissibility test under s.276(2).The basic principles governing the application of s.276 were reviewed in Regina v. T.(M.), 2012 ONCA 511, per Watt J.A., on behalf of the court (at paras. 29-43):
The Governing Principles
Section 276 of the Criminal Codecreates a statutory rule of admissibility.Enacted in negative terms, the section, like other admissibility rules, is exclusionary; it precludes the admission of certain evidence. The exclusionary effect of the rule only becomes engaged when three requirements have been met. For
discussion purposes, these requirements, which are cumulative, may be characterized as:
i.offence charged;
ii.subject-matter; and
iii. purpose.
The exclusionary rule prohibits the person charged from introducing certain evidence (subject-matter) for a specific use (purpose) in proceedings for a listed crime (offence).
The “offence” requirement is satisfied where the proceedings in which evidence is tendered relate to a listed offence.Among the listed offences are the crimes charged here: sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.
The “subject-matter” requirement, which appears in both sections 276(1) and (2), is best expressed in the language of subsection (2):
Evidence … that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity other than the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge, whether with the accused or with any other person.
If the subject-matter of the proposed evidence falls outside the statutory language, the exclusionary terms of the provision do not apply.On the other hand, satisfaction of the subject-matter requirement, on its own, will not necessitate exclusion; the “purpose” requirement must also be satisfied.
The “purpose” requirement is crucial to the operation of this exclusionary rule, just as it is with the common law hearsay rule. To engage the exclusionary rule of s. 276, the proposed evidence must be offered to support either of two prohibited inferences grounded on the sexual nature of the activity:
i. that the complainant is more likely to have consented to the conduct charged; or
ii.that the complainant is less worthy of belief.
Where the purpose underlying the introduction of the evidence of extrinsic sexual activity is neither of those prohibited by s. 276(1), this exclusionary rule is not engaged.
Section 276(2) provides an exception to the exclusionary rule. To gain entry under this exception, evidence of the complainant’s extrinsic sexual activity must:
i.be of specific instances of sexual activity;
ii. be relevant to an issue at trial; and
iii. have significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.
To determine whether the evidence should be admitted under this exception, the presiding judge must follow the procedure described in ss. 276.1 and 276.2 and consider the factors listed in s. 276(3).
The admissibility rules of s. 276 apply only where the evidence proposed for admission is of extrinsic sexual activity on the part of the complainant. A previous allegation of assault, without more, would fall outside the section: R. v. Gervais1990 CanLII 3701 (QC CA), (1990), 58 C.C.C. (3d) 141 (Que. C.A.), at p. 154. Questions that focus on the fact, rather than the details, of an allegation of sexual assault are not prohibited by the section: R. v. M. (A.G.)(1993), 26 C.R. (4th) 379 (Que. C.A.), at p. 393.
To be receivable in a criminal trial each piece of evidence must satisfy three requirements:
• relevance
•materiality
•admissibility.
These requirements are cumulative. Evidence that comes up short on any requirement is excluded from consideration by the trier of fact.
Thus, Section 276 of the Criminal Code permits cross-examination of sexual offence complainants on prior sexual activity only in certain circumstances. In ReginavR.V.,2018 ONCA 547 (CanLII),the Ontario Court of Appeal held that s.276 does not require that the defence particularize specific instances of alleged prior sexual activity. Rather the defence lawyer is only required to demonstrate that the prior sexual activity be “adequately identified”; and tied to a proper purpose. The court ordered a new trial for sexual assault where the defence was wrongly prevented from cross-examining the complainant on her prior sexual activity.
In that case, the Crown at trial had argued that the fifteen (15) year-old complainant’s pregnancy was consistent with her allegations. This implied that only the accused could be the father. The application judge dismissed the defence’s application under s.276 to cross-examine the complainant on whether this was true. The Court of Appeal held that “the Crown’s position amounted to this: we say you are the only one who could have impregnated the complainant but you are not allowed to question her about whether this is true” (at para. 27). This, the Court of Appeal found, was “patently unfair.”
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that although there was no “fixed rule” that required granting the s.276 application, the application judge erred by requiring the defence to articulate particularized “specific instances of sexual activity.” The sexual activity was adequately identified as any activity that could have caused the pregnancy. The court’s focus should be on the probative value of the line of questioning, not on the likelihood that the cross-examination will produce results. It was no substitute to permit the defence to simply ask the complainant whether she was telling the truth; the point of cross-examination is to challenge the witness’s answers.
The court also held the trial judge, who replaced the application judge before trial, erred by holding he lacked jurisdiction to revisit the application judge’s s.276 application. A trial judge always has jurisdiction to revisit prior rulings in the same trial, and this is also true where the trial judge has replaced another judge.
Being charged with a serious, violent crime like sexual assault, may call for the assistance of an Criminal Defence lawyer in Alberta or other provinces in Canada. A lawyer will review all the evidence about the alleged sexual assault; and advise his or her client on how best to fight any charges. If the accused was not taken into custody according to the letter of the law, a lawyer might be able to have the charges dropped. An accused client has the right to mount an aggressive defense with the knowledge that it is incumbent upon the Crown to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
If you have been charged with a sexual assault offence under the Criminal Code of Canada, contact Mr. J.S. Patel, Calgary Criminal Lawyer for an initial free consultation at 403-585-1960.
Defence in mistaken belief in consent for sexual assault
In Reginav. Donnelly, 2018 ONCA 575 (CanLII), the Ontario Court of Appeal set aside the accused’s conviction for sexual assault and ordered a new trial. In this case, the complainant was a woman who had been forced into the sex trade. This complainant had testified that she went along with oral and protected vaginal sex, but that during intercourse, the accused performed certain acts, and removed his condom and continued vaginal intercourse without her consent. According to the complainant, during the sexual intercourse the appellant pulled a strap-on out of his drawer and asked if they could use it. The complainant said that she told the appellant no but he proceeded to penetrate her with it. Further she testified that the appellant removed his condom and continued vaginal intercourse, despite the fact that she had told him to keep the condom on.
The accused/appellant flatly denied these allegations. In his testimony, the appellant admitted to the oral and protected vaginal sex, but denied that they had sex without a condom or that he used a strap-on. He also denied ejaculating into the complainant’s vagina but testified that he ejaculated onto her face with her permission. Typically, such evidence would warrant the application of the use of the legal test in Regina v. W(d), [1991] 1 SCR 742, 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC) where ideally, the appropriate instructions on the issue of credibility should be given, not only during the main charge, but on any recharge. A trial judge might well instruct the jury on the question of credibility along these lines:
First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must acquit.
Second, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit.
Third, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, you must ask yourself whether, on the basis of the evidence which you do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused.
On appeal, the accused argued that the trial judge erred by placing the defence of honest but mistaken belief to the jury, since it was entirely inconsistent with his testimony denying that the acts in question took place. The court of appeal agreed with that argument because there was “no air of reality” to that defence. An “air of reality” was defined by the Supreme Court of Canada, in the following way in Reginav. Cinous, [2002] 2 SCR 3, 2002 SCC 29(CanLII):
“A defence should be put to a jury if, and only if, there is an evidential foundation for it. A trial judge must thus put to the jury all defences that arise on the facts, whether or not they have been specifically raised by an accused, but he has a positive duty to keep from the jury defences lacking an evidential foundation — or air of reality. This is so even if the defence is the only defence open to the accused. The air of reality test imposes a burden on the accused that is merely evidential, rather than persuasive. In applying the air of reality test, a trial judge considers the totality of the evidence, and assumes the evidence relied upon by the accused to be true. The threshold determination by the trial judge is not aimed at deciding the substantive merits of the defence. That question is reserved for the jury. The trial judge does not make determinations about the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, make findings of fact, or draw determinate factual inferences. Nor is the air of reality test intended to assess whether the defence is likely to succeed at the end of the day. The question for the trial judge is whether the evidence discloses a real issue to be decided by the jury, and not how the jury should ultimately decide the issue.”
Furthermore, the manner in which it was put to the jury obscured the accused’s actual defence and position on what happened. The trial judge misstated the accused’s position by telling the jury that the accused honestly believed that the complainant had consented to the acts in question when he clearly testified that the acts did not take place. The charge would only serve to confuse the jury and a new trial was needed.
Being charged with a serious, violent crime like sexual assault, may call for the assistance of an Criminal Defence lawyer in Alberta or other provinces in Canada. A lawyer will review all the evidence about the alleged sexual assault; and advise his or her client on how best to fight any charges. If the accused was not taken into custody according to the letter of the law, a lawyer might be able to have the charges dropped. An accused client has the right to mount an aggressive defense with the knowledge that it is incumbent upon the Crown to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
If you have been charged with a sexual assault offence under the Criminal Code of Canada, contact Mr. J.S. Patel, Calgary Criminal Lawyer for an initial free consultation at 403-585-1960.
If you have been convicted of a Criminal Code offence or of an offence under an Act of Parliament resulting in a jail term, an application can be made to secure judicial interim release (i.e. Bail) pending the outcome of your appeal.
It is critical to note, that the criminal law standards for securing bail are elevated, primarily due to the loss of the presumption of innocence due to the entry of the conviction. Section 679(3) of the Criminal Code allows a judge of a court of appeal to order the release of an offender who has appealed his (or her) conviction “if the appellant establishes that (a) the appeal … is not frivolous; (b) he will surrender himself into custody in accordance with the terms of the order; and (c) his detention is not necessary in the public interest.” There are two (2) components to the last criterion. The offender must establish that he or she is not a threat to public safety – the offender will not commit a criminal offence while on bail – and that a reasonable person who is thoughtful, dispassionate, informed and respectful of society’s fundamental values would not lose confidence in the administration of justice if the appeal court released the applicant.
In determining the public interest involves the balancing of great many factors. Some were listed in Regina v McNaughton, 2010 ABCA 97at para. 12, 26 Alta LR (5th) 126:
Without attempting to compile a complete list, some of the factors that are relevant to the exercise of the jurisdiction include:
ensuring fairness in the appeal process, to avoid the prospect of the applicant serving a sentence when the appeal is ultimately allowed (Charter of Rights, s. 11(e); Farinacciat paras. 43, 48; v. Fox, 2000 ABCA 283, 8 M.V.R. (4th) 1 at paras. 18-9; R. v. Colville, 2003 ABCA 133, 327 A.R. 143 at para. 12);
the fact of conviction, and the public importance of respecting the trial decision and the trial process (Nguyen[ (1997), 97 BCAC 86, 119 CCC (3d) 269] at para.18; Farinacciat para. 41; v. Rhyason, 2006 ABCA 120, 57 Alta. L.R. (4th) 31, 208 C.C.C. (3d) 193);
the apparent strength of the grounds for appeal, recognizing that it is not the role of the bail judge to resolve the merits ( v. Heyden(1999), 127 O.A.C. 190, 141 C.C.C. (3d) 570 at paras. 7-8, 12; Rhyasonat paras. 13-18; Colvilleat para. 16);
the standard of review that will be applied by the appeal court ( v. Sagoo, 2009 ABCA 357, 464 A.R. 258 at para. 9);
any risk that the applicant will reoffend if released (Nguyenat para. 7; Foxat paras.18, 20-21);
the applicant’s history of compliance with court orders and legally imposed conditions;
whether the applicant was released pending trial, and if so if his release was uneventful;
whether conditions of release could be crafted that would protect the public interest;
the seriousness of the charges, reflected in the severity of the sentence, although no class of offence is excluded from release (Nguyenat paras. 13, 20-24; Heydenat para. 12; v. R.D.L.(1995), 178 A.R. 142 at para. 5);
the effect on the perception of the administration of justice if the applicant is released, including the perception of an informed and reasonable member of society (Nguyenat paras. 25-6; Rhyasonat para. 20; Foxat para. 18; Colvilleat para. 17);
the status and state of readiness of the appeal (Farinacciat paras. 44, 48; Heydenat para. 12; D.L.at paras. 5, 12).
The Court of Appeal has recently considered two (2) cases that have considered the recent application of this rule: R. v. C.L, infra, and R. v. B.G. Each are discussed below:
Regina v. C.L, infra
The Ontario of Court of Appeal dismissed the accused’s application for bail pending appeal. Following a judge-alone trial, the accused in this case was convicted of sexual assault and being unlawfully in a dwelling house. As a consequence of the conviction and the outcome of the sentencing hearing, this accused person received a sentence of two (2) years less a day imprisonment plus two (2) years of probation. His application for bail pending appeal was dismissed. In dismissing the accused’s application, Trotter J.A. held that the public interest criterion was not met. This was because “[t]he materials filed fail to demonstrate that the grounds of appeal have sufficient strength to overcome the serious enforceability considerations present in this case” (at para. 21).
The Ontario Court of Appeal took umbrage with accused’s new charges of breach of recognizance, combined with his failure to mention them in his bail pending appeal affidavits. The Court stated that it did not inspire confidence about compliance with any bail pending appeal order that might be made. Justice Trotter stated as follows (at para. 13): “The new criminal charges should have been disclosed. Judges of this court rely heavily on the trustworthiness of affidavits sworn in support of bail pending appeal applications. They are expected to be both accurate and completeRegina v. B.G, Infra,
In Regina and B.G., 2018 ONCA 455 (RD), Justice Brown of the Ontario Court of Appeal, granted the accused’s application for bail pending appeal from his conviction for child pornography and sexual offences. The trial judge found that the accused had taken and distributed photographs depicting his young daughter naked. The Crown opposed the application on the grounds that the public interest criterion was not met. The public interest criterion in s. 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code consists of two components: public safety and public confidence in the administration of justice:R v. Oland, 2017 SCC 17, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 250, at paras. 23 & 26. The public confidence criterion requires balancing several factors: the seriousness of the offence; the strength of the grounds of appeal; public safety; and flight risks: Oland, at paras. 37-
Justice Brown held as follows:
[12] The offences of which the applicant was convicted are very serious, involving as they do a vulnerable young child. However, when that factor is weighed with the remaining factors under the Oland public interest test – the strength of the grounds of appeal, no flight risk, and no threat to public safety – on balance, reviewability is favoured over enforceability.
“The offences of which the applicant was convicted are very serious, involving as they do a vulnerable young child. However, when that factor is weighed with the remaining factors under the Oland public interest test – the strength of the grounds of appeal, no flight risk, and no threat to public safety – on balance, reviewability is favoured over enforceability.”
These cases demonstrate the importance of the benefits of a properly prepared bail application (affidavits and arguments). The procedure in securing bail prior to trial differs markedly when a conviction has been entered and a person has been remanded into custody.
If you have been convicted of a criminal code offence and you are seeking bail, contact Mr. J.S. Patel, Barrister at 403-585-1960 to secure a telephone consultation.
Failure to Provide the Necessities of Life. Elements of the Offence and the sufficiency of a jury charge.
The parents of the deceased child had their conviction for the failure to provide the necessities of life for their (deceased) child overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada (the “SCC”) recently. In Regina v. Stephan, 2018 SCC 21, the SCC overturned the a ruling from the Alberta Court of Appeal and adopted reasoning of Justice O’Ferrall’s dissent.
The facts in this case were extremely unfortunate. The majority of the panel at the Alberta Court of Appeal restated the facts in the following terms:
[2] The appellants’ son, Ezekiel, was born in August 2010. On February 27, 2012, Ezekiel began to exhibit signs of illness while at pre-school. Symptoms included fever, decreased appetite, and trouble breathing and swallowing.
[3] Both parents were concerned. Rather than take him to a medical clinic, however, they contacted a family friend, a nurse, by telephone. After listening to Ezekiel’s breathing over the phone, the friend thought the problem might be croup. The appellants treated Ezekiel with fresh air, fluids, humidity and natural supplements including garlic, olive leaf extract and Methylsulonylmethane.
[4] Over the next few days, Ezekiel’s fever abated but he still felt hot. He continued to have a decreased appetite, low energy, decreased activity, and trouble breathing.
[5] By March 5, the appellants felt Ezekiel’s condition had improved as he no longer had trouble breathing, and he returned to pre-school. DavidStephanwent out of town to work.
[6] A day later, March 6, Ezekiel was weaker. He was less responsive; he stayed in bed and moaned. He tugged at his diaper and rubbed his face, both movements that seemed to ColletStephanto be involuntary. ColletStephanlooked online for a possible explanation and phoned DavidStephanto report that Ezekiel seemed to be getting sick again.
[7] DavidStephanreturned from work on March 8 with some natural products he had picked up while away. Ezekiel was fed apple cider vinegar, onion powder, ginger root, garlic, hot peppers and horseradish root. Over the next few days, Ezekiel’s condition appeared to improve, although he began to show signs of stiffness or joint tension.
[8] Between March 9 and 12, the stiffness increased and Ezekiel’s back began to arch. He refused food, and his lethargy and weakness increased. His parents were worried.
[9] On March 12, DavidStephanwent to a business meeting. ColletStephanphoned a nurse friend to ask her to examine Ezekiel. Collet told her husband about her concerns when he came home for lunch.
[10] The family friend examined Ezekiel and suggested the problem might be meningitis. She suggested that Ezekiel be taken to the doctor. Rather than following that advice, ColletStephansearched the internet seeking information about meningitis. Based upon the information she obtained, ColletStephantried the Brudzinski and Kernig tests for meningitis. The tests involve physical manipulation of the child’s head or legs. Ezekiel tested positive on both, but Collet concluded Ezekiel had viral meningitis, rather than the more serious form of bacterial meningitis. ColletStephancommunicated her conclusions to her husband when he returned from a second business meeting that day.
[11] DavidStephanstayed home the following day, March 13,to help and to take ColletStephanto Lethbridge to sign some documents. Before leaving for Lethbridge, ColletStephancontacted a naturopathic clinic to get some advice about boosting Ezekiel’s immune system because he had meningitis. The receptionist told her to take Ezekiel to a doctor.
[12] The appellants proceeded to Lethbridge with Ezekiel lying on a bed in the back of their vehicle because he could no longer sit comfortably in his car seat. After dealing with their lawyer, the appellants went to the naturopathic clinic to purchase an echinacea tincture called Blast. They administered this to Ezekiel, went shopping, and then returned home.
[13] That evening, Ezekiel began exhibiting difficulty breathing. About 9:00 p.m., after ColletStephanhad returned from a meeting, Ezekiel stopped breathing. DavidStephanphoned his father AnthonyStephanand then 911.
[14] ColletStephangot Ezekiel breathing again by slapping him on the back and then giving him a few rescue breaths. DavidStephanphoned 911 to call off the ambulance saying they would bring Ezekiel to the hospital by car. The family left 20 minutes later for the Cardston hospital but before they arrived, Ezekiel again stopped breathing. ColletStephanperformed CPR while DavidStephandrove on and phoned 911. They were met by an ambulance outside of Cardston.
[15] The responders began performing CPR but they had difficulty securing an airway due to a lack of proper equipment. This deficiency lasted eight minutes until just before the ambulance reached the hospital in Cardston.
[16] Ezekiel was treated at the Cardston hospital and then transferred to Lethbridge in order to be taken by STARS air ambulance to the Children’s Hospital in Calgary. He never regained consciousness. On March 15 and 16, Ezekiel was neurologically assessed and determined to be brain-dead. Life sustaining therapies were discontinued and on March 18, 2012, Ezekiel died.
However, Justice O’Ferrall said the following about the facts of the case, in his dissent:
[211] On the facts of this case, it cannot be argued that the Stephans were not devoted and loving parents. They did not neglect their 18-month old son’s symptoms when he exhibited them. They did not fail to provide him with what they thought were the necessaries of life. They monitored him closely when he became ill, doing what they believed was best for him. There is no doubt the decisions they made with respect to the well-being of their son turned out to be terribly wrong, but it is not clear that their acts or omissions were criminal in the sense of deserving of punishment for moral blameworthiness.
[212] That said, a jury of their peers did find the Stephans guilty of failing to provide the necessaries of life to their son, contrary to section 215(2)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code. However, as argued by the appellants, the trial judge’s charge to the jury was problematic, perhaps to the point of impacting the fairness of the trial. At the very least, the jury charge was confusing, misleading, and deficient in describing a key element of the offence. Furthermore, the trial judge did not properly instruct the jury on the fault element or the mens rea of the offence. The cumulative effect of the jury instructions may have been an unsafe or suspect verdict.
The SCC accepted Justice O’Ferrall’s reasoning that in sum, the trial judge failed in his jury charge for three (3) reasons:
(1)The Trial Judge he did not adequately explain what the jury’s focus should have been in determining whether there had been a failureunder the second element of the offence. The full legal test, outlining the elements of the offence, was explained in Reginav F,2008 SCC 60 (CanLII) at paras 66-67, [2008] 3 SCR 215:
The actus reus of failing to provide the necessaries of life will be established if it is proved (1) that the accused was under a legal duty to provide the necessaries of life to the person in question pursuant to s. 215(1)(a); (2) that, from an objective standpoint, he or she failed to perform the duty; and (3) that, again from an objective standpoint, this failure endangered the life of the person to whom the duty was owed, or caused or was likely to cause the health of that person to be endangered permanently. Following Charron J.’s reasoning in R. v. Beatty, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49, 2008 SCC 5 (CanLII), the marked departure standard is not applied at this point, since “[n]othing is gained by adding to the words of [the statute] at this stage of the analysis” (para. 45).
The mens rea of failing to provide the necessaries of life will be established if it is proved that the conduct of the accused represented a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonable parent, foster parent, guardian or family head in the same circumstances.
Each of the four elements specified in the above test (the three elements of the actus reus plus the mens rearequirement) must be proven in order to obtain a conviction. It was important for the jury to keep these four distinct elements in mind. However, the trial judge, in his charge to the jury, combined two of them.
Secondly, the trial judge appeared to incorrectly assume the third (3rd) element of the offence had already been met in instructing the jury on the second (2nd) element of the offence. The trial judge made the following comments to the jury in this case:
In deciding whether the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that David Stephan failed to provide necessaries of life you must determine whether the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct of David Stephan represented a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonably prudent and ordinary person where that reasonable person, in all the circumstances of David Stephan would foresee that medical attention was required to maintain Ezekiel’s life, and that reasonable person would also foresee that failing to provide the medical attention would endanger Ezekiel’s life.
This was found to be an error by Justice O’Ferral because “…he foregoing instruction seems to invite the jury to assume as true the latter half of the statement (in bold) when considering whether the conduct of the parents amounted to a failure to provide the necessaries of life. The latter half of the statement is essentially the third element of the actus reus of the offence, which is to be determined only after a failure to provide the necessaries of life has been established.”
Thirdly, the trial failed to adequately explain the mens rea element of the offence to the jury. Specifically, the Trial Judge was required to explain what constituted a “marked departure”; and this was not done. Marked departure is a difficult concept even for those with legal training and therefore requires explanation. The discussion in Regina v Beatty, 2008 SCC 5 (CanLII), [2008] 1 SCR 49 is helpful. That case dealt with the charge of dangerous driving which, like that of failing to provide the necessaries of life, requires proof of a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person in order to found a conviction. The majority in Beatty explains, at paragraph 7, that:
The distinction between a mere departure and a marked departure from the norm is a question of degree. It is only when the conduct meets the higher threshold that the court may find, on the basis of that conduct alone, a blameworthy state of mind.
This case demonstrates the necessity of ensuring that the jury charge is properly examined before being put to the jury either at the trial stage or (after the fact) at the appellate stage of the criminal law proceedings. It is critical to seek the advice of a criminal trial and appeal lawyer in face serious criminal charges wherein the Crown is seeking a conviction for failure to provide for the necessities of life.
If you have been charged with a serious criminal offence, contact Mr. J.S. Patel, Criminal Lawyer for advice at 403-585-1960.
Section 7(1) of the Controlled Drugs Substances Act
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a decision of the Superior Court in striking down the mandatory minimums required under ‘Unauthorized Production” provisions of Section 7(1) of Controlled Drugs Substances Act (the “CDSA”). InReginaand VU, 2018 ONCA 436, the Ontario Court of Appeal considered three (3) separate sentence appeals, from three (2) accused persons who had levied a challenge, through defence counsel, to the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentences for marijuana production under the CDSA. Each defendants, Pham, Vu, Li, were convicted of unauthorized production of marijuana under s.7(1) of the CDSA. Criminal Defence counsel, at the sentencing stage, had filed an application under the Judicature Act to challenge the applicable mandatory minimum as contrary to s.12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedomsas cruel and unusual punishment. Each appeal is summarized below.
In the Regina v. Pham appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge’s ruling (which is reported at 2016 ONSC 5312) that the two (2)-year mandatory minimum under CDSA s.7(2)(b)(v) which involves the production of more than five hundred (500) plants was contrary to s.12. That same order of juridical logic was applied to s.7(2)(b)(vi) (three-year minimum for production of more than five-hundred (500) plants where statutory aggravating factor applies. What is more, the ONCA also upheld the ruling, from the Sentencing Court, that the aggravating factor under CDSA s.7(3)(c), which is the production constituting a potential safety hazard in a residential area was unconstitutional. In considering the application of the famed Reginav. Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103test, the highest Court in Ontario found that none of these provisions could be saved under s.1 of the Charter. The Court stated the following in relevant part:
[83] I do not accept these submissions. With respect to ss. 7(2)(b)(vi) and 7(3)(c), they ignore the fundamental finding that this three-year mandatory minimum can apply to persons who have no moral culpability in relation to the statutory aggravating factor. The provisions could have been tailored to avoid this result. They are neither minimally impairing nor proportionate.[84] Similarly, with respect to s. 7(2)(b)(v), as the Pham sentencing judge noted, Parliament could have provided a safety valve to allow judges to grant exemptions in exceptional cases. Once again, the provisions are neither minimally impairing nor proportional.
The court also rejected the Crown’s argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that the impugned mandatory minimum provisions could be “read down” by inserting the words “if the production is for the purpose of trafficking” into each subsection.
In the Reginav. Vuappeal, the Ontario upheld Justice Durno striking down of the three (3) year minimum arising out of s.7(3)(c) of the CDSA(reported at 2015 ONSC 5834 and 2015 ONSC 7965), but set aside his ruling that the two (2) year minimum under s.7(2)(b)(v) was constitutional. The court held that its findings in the Phamappeal governed the constitutional issues in the Vu Appeal with equal force. Durno J. had also struck down the mandatory minimums under ss.7(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the CDSA (less than 201 and more than five plants). The accused had not been charged under these sections. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown that it was not open to the sentencing judge to declare invalid provisions not applicable to the accused. As a result, the Crown did not have an appeal route in relation to these declarations as they did not play a role in the sentencing decision and the court did not have to consider their constitutionality.
In the Li appeal, the court reversed the sentencing judge’s ruling (reported at 2016 ONSC 1757) and held that the 12-month mandatory minimum under s.7(2)(b)(iii) of the CDSA (production of more than 200 but less than 501 plants) violated s.12 of the Charter and could not be saved under s.1. The analysis and reasonable hypotheticals from the Pham appeal applied equally to this accused. The Court concluded the case in the following terms at paragraphs 119 to 121:
[119] In summary, I would dismiss the Crown’s appeal in Pham and uphold the declarations that ss. 7(2)(b)(v), (vi) and 7(3)(c) of the CDSA are unconstitutional.
[120] I would also dismiss the Crown’s appeal in Vu. My conclusion in respect of the Pham appeal governs the constitutional arguments in relation to ss. 7(2)(b)(v), (vi) and 7(3)(c). The Crown has not demonstrated that it has an appeal route to this court relating to their ss. 7(2)(b)(i) and (ii) argument as the declarations of invalidity in relation to those sections had no impact on the sentence Mr. Vu received. As Mr. Vu has now completed his sentence, I would dismiss his sentence appeal as moot.
[121] Finally, I would allow Mr. Li’s appeal. Based on my reasoning in the Pham appeal, I would hold that s. 7(2)(b)(iii) of the CDSA violates s. 12 of the Charter, cannot be saved by s. 1 and should be declared of no force and effect under s. 52 of the Constitution Act. I would reduce Mr. Li’s sentence from 12 months’ imprisonment to six months’ less one day.
This case demonstrates the importance the importance of considering the constitutionality of mandatory minimums before concede the statutorily imposed requirements in the Code. A well-crafted section 12 Charterchallenge can make the difference between years of imprisonment and possibly a non-custodial term.
Call Mr. J.S. Patel, Barrister for a consultation, if you have been charged with producing a controlled substance under the CDSA: 403-585-1960.
Recently the Court of Appeal in Regina v. Williams, 2018 ONCA 367the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the accused’s appeal against his twelve (12)-year sentence (less five years for time served) which was imposed, following his guilty plea, in response to convictions for drug and firearm offences arising out of two sets of charges. He pled guilty to: 1) Possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, 2) Possession of cannabis for the purpose of trafficking, 3) Carrying a concealed firearm, 4) Possession of a restricted firearm with readily accessible ammunition, and 5) Breach of recognizance (for possession of a firearm).
The trial court imposed what the Court of Appeal viewed as a crushing sentence, which precluding the prospects of rehabilitation, a valid sentencing objective. The Court of Appeal stated:
While the sentencing judge noted the appellant’s guilty pleas to the second set of charges in his narrative of events, his reasons do not indicate he took the guilty pleas into account in determining the appropriate sentence. Further, while the trial judge noted the appellant’s relative youth at the time of sentencing, his reasons do not indicate he took into account that the appellant was just 23 years of age and a first offender at the time of the first set of offences or that a first penitentiary sentence should be the shortest possible that achieves the relevant sentencing objectives. Finally, we are of the view the sentencing judge did not accord sufficient weight to the factor that the appellant should not be crushed by the sentence. In our view, the sentence imposed all but eliminates the appellant’s prospects for rehabilitation when considering the “Principles and Purposes of Sentencing” in the Criminal Code of Canada. While denunciation and deterrence are widely accepted as primary sentencing principles, section 718(d) clearly requires consideration to the issue of rehabilitation.
The reasons for sentence did not indicate that the sentencing judge took into account the fact that the accused was only 23 years old and a first offender at the time of the first set of charges, or that a first penitentiary sentence should be the shortest possible sentence that achieves the relevant sentencing objectives. Furthermore, the sentencing judge failed to sufficiently consider that the sentence should not be crushing to the accused. The court reduced the sentence to nine years.
If you are seeking to appeal your conviction against your sentence, contact our law firm at 403-585-1960 and speak to J.S. Patel, Barrister. We accept legal aid on a case by case basis and charge a consultation fee for a review of appellate matters.
In Reginav. Hines, 2018 ONCJ 197, the Ontario Court of Justice held the police used excessive force where, in the context of a “chaotic” situation, they struck the accused in the face with a baton and pepper sprayed him while he was handcuffed.
The relevant facts were as follows:
Excessive Force
[18] As indicated at the outset, Mr. Brannagan conceded that Brewer’s use of pepper spray was excessive force and a Charter violation. Mr. Chu also alleged that, in addition to pepper spray, excessive force was used in striking Mr. Hines in the face with a baton during the arrest. Those blows opened up two significant lacerations on the defendant’s face, which was made additionally painful by the application of pepper spray. The Crown refused to call Brewer, submitting that the defendant had the burden to prove facts that supported the Charter violation. While I agree the burden lies with the defendant to establish Charter violations, I ruled that fairness required this Court to call Brewer as a witness, allowing both counsel the opportunity to conduct cross-examinations. I did so because Brewer was, by nature of his actions that night, and by nature of his position as a police officer, a witness adverse to the defendant’s interest.
Constable Brewer
[19] Brewer admitted striking Hines with his baton. He is unable to remember the number of strikes or the exact location of the strikes. Brewer was aware of facial injuries suffered by Hines but unaware if the cause was his baton strikes or when he was taken to the ground. He maintained he was frightened by the knife, and Hines assaultive behaviour, and not knowing if Hines still had a weapon. He also maintained the blows were done to effect an arrest, and not after Hines was handcuffed.
[20] Constable Brewer’s status as a police officer is somewhat unusual. In September of 2017, he was convicted of Common Nuisance and Unauthorized Possession of a Firearm in Durham region arising from an incident that occurred on December 1, 2016. Constable Brewer had brought a handgun into the bedroom in which his spouse was sleeping, then followed her to the main floor holding the gun, put the gun in his own mouth, and then fired it eight times into the night sky outside his house. At the time, Brewer agreed he was suffering from depression, alcoholism and PTSD.
[21] In addition to the criminal record resulting from the incident above, Brewer admitted drinking while on duty and being disciplined for it in November of 2016. Brewer denies alcohol was a factor in this case and does not think his mental health problems were either. Essentially he was of the view that Hines was “being actively resistant” and was attempting to get out of his scout car when he employed pepper spray.
[22] While I found Constable Brewer’s evidence to be for the most part candid (and quite heartbreaking regarding his present condition), this last contention is demonstrably false. Mr. Hines was handcuffed to the rear and splayed out horizontally in the back seat of the scout car. Brewer stopped the scout car as it starts to leave the scene, and Brewer opened the door. Hines was not resisting; he was not kicking; and he certainly was not trying to escape.
[23] In my view, to insist escape was the reason for employing pepper spray undermines what was otherwise credible evidence. That false contention makes his evidence, that he was unsure that his baton strikes connected with the defendant’s face, virtually impossible to accept.
At the Charter application, the Crown refused to call as a witness the police officer who struck and sprayed the accused, and so the court called the officer as a witness adverse in interest to the defence. The court declined to stay the charges (assault police, possession of a knife, possession of cocaine, and threatening), holding that a remedy could be fashioned on sentence. The Court stated that:
[34] A stay of proceedings is a drastic remedy, a remedy of last resort to be granted only in the clearest of cases (O’Connor1995 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411). The defendant submits that no remedy short of a stay of proceedings is appropriate. Alternative remedies, sentence reduction for example, would not send the necessary message that the justice system denounces police brutality.
[35] The defendant does not argue abuse of process in that the police conduct interfered with a fair trial. Rather, that it fell within the residual category referred to in paragraph 73 of O’Connor:
73 As I have already noted, the common law doctrine of abuse of process has found application in a variety of different circumstances involving state conduct touching upon the integrity of the judicial system and the fairness of the individual accused’s trial. For this reason, I do not think that it is helpful to speak of there being any one particular “right against abuse of process” within the Charter. Depending on the circumstances, different Charter guarantees may be engaged. For instance, where the accused claims that the Crown’s conduct has prejudiced his ability to have a trial within a reasonable time, abuses may be best addressed by reference to s. 11(b) of the Charter, to which the jurisprudence of this Court has now established fairly clear guidelines (Morin, supra). Alternatively, the circumstances may indicate an infringement of the accused’s right to a fair trial, embodied in ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. In both of these situations, concern for the individual rights of the accused may be accompanied by concerns about the integrity of the judicial system. In addition, there is a residual category of conduct caught by s. 7 of the Charter. This residual category does not relate to conduct affecting the fairness of the trial or impairing other procedural rights enumerated in the Charter, but instead addresses the panoply of diverse and sometimes unforeseeable circumstances in which a prosecution is conducted in such a manner as to connote unfairness or vexatiousness of such a degree that it contravenes fundamental notions of justice and thus undermines the integrity of the judicial process.
[36] When determining if a stay is the appropriate remedy for the “residual” category, the approach taken by the Supreme Court in R. v. Regan sets out the appropriate test to be considered. There are three factors to be considered by a court asked to order a stay of proceedings, as set out in Regan 2002 SCC 12 (CanLII), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, at paras. 54 – 57:
(1) Will the prejudice caused by the impugned behaviour be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of a trial, or by its outcome;
(2) Is any other remedy reasonably capable of removing the prejudice; and
(3) If there should be doubt as to the appropriateness of a stay, how do the interests that would be served by a stay weigh against society’s interest in having a final decision on the charges on the merits?
[37] Applying the above test, I conclude that there is a societal interest in having a judicial decision on the merits regarding the knife attack on Mr. Humphries. A remedy exists to reflect police brutality, which can be factored into the sentence. The assault police, possession of the knife, possession of cocaine, and uttering threats charges will be stayed as the only remedy capable of expressing this Court’s condemnation of Constable Brewer’s excessive use of force, as well as a recognition of the significant harm caused to Mr. Hines resulting from this brutality.
A different result was achieved in Reginav. Girbav, 2012 ABPC 219 wherein the Court, on similarly related facts, entered a stay of Proceedings by the Honourable Judge Brown of the Provincial Court of Alberta. In that decision, the Court, in directing the stay stated:
“While the beating meted out to Mr. Girbav was a far cry from the horrific assault in Tran, to allow the prosecution to continue, given the wantonness of the attack on Mr. Girbav and the attempt at burnishing the account after the fact, would cause irreparable harm to the justice system. As in Mohmedi, Gladue and Tran, this appears to be a case in which the officers succumbed to anger in their dealings with Mr. Girbav.”
Cleary, this is a fact-driven inquiry that is mixed with complex issues of law and jurisprudence. It is critical to seek legal advice as soon as possible to ensure that the relevant evidence (including injuries) are well documented and evidence is preserved.
The above noted information is not intended as legal advice nor does it puport to provide information on any civil claims against a police force. It is general information about specifically reported cases .
If you have been charged with a offence that involved the use of excessive police force and/or abuse, call Mr. J.S. Patel, Criminal Defence Lawyer at403-585-1960for a consultation during regular office hours.
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